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ABSTRACT 
PAUL W. THRONE: Under-Reporting of Surgical Errors: State Perceptions and 
Responses 
(Under the direction of Sandra Greene, DrPH) 
 
 Objective: Under-reporting of surgical errors inhibits development of 
knowledge and strategies that can lead to lower error rates. Mandatory error 
reporting programs have proliferated among states as one means of reducing the 
incidence of errors. Evidence suggests that errors are under-reported. Little is known 
of the perceptions of states regarding the risk of under-reporting, their responses to 
it and the ways they use reported data to improve patient safety. A qualitative study 
was conducted to assess the perceptions of state managers regarding the risk of 
under-reporting and the role of enforcement, analysis and feedback in current and 
ideal error reporting programs 
 Methods: 24 state medical error reporting programs were surveyed for 
characteristics and perceptions of surgical error reporting compliance. A key 
informant sample of 11 states explored perceptions of barriers and facilitators to 
reporting, and current and ideal strategies for enforcement and data use. Qualitative 
data were coded for themes and key findings. A plan for change responds to the 
conclusions.  
 Results: 52% of states had discovered surgical errors through means other 
than required reporting by health care institutions. 76% of states reported that it was 
impossible to know whether all required reports were made. Some managers did not 
have adequate resources to enforce reporting, analyze data or engage the health 
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care industry to improve patient safety. State managers understood most of the 
same reasons given by the health care industry in the literature for failure to report, 
except lack of program usefulness and feedback. Most managers valued using error 
data analysis in collaboration with the health care industry to reduce the incidence of 
surgical errors, but only 37.5% of states use data this way. 
 Conclusion: Most state managers do not know whether their programs 
receive all required surgical error reports, and most do not have the resources to use 
data the way they would like to. Managers did not understand lack of program value 
and feedback as an important barrier. A plan for change provides education to states 
and recommendations that include standardization of reporting requirements, data 
sharing, and new requirements for error reporting. 
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Chapter 1: Surgical Errors and Error Reporting Systems 
 
Medical errors are a frequent occurrence in acute care. Surgical errors are an 
important subtype of medical errors and are the focus of this study. Efforts to prevent 
surgical errors include procedural and systems advances, and internal and external 
reporting systems. This study examines external reporting systems by exploring the 
perceptions of regulators regarding compliance with mandatory reporting 
requirements and the use of the information provided by health care entities. 
The perspective of regulators on the strength of the error reporting 
relationship between state agencies and the health care industry is not well 
understood. This study develops this knowledge and leads to suggestions that will 
enhance the effectiveness of mandatory surgical error reporting as one strategy to 
reduce the incidence of surgical errors. 
Medical Errors and System Challenges 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) estimated in 1999 that as many as 98,000 
deaths annually may be attributed to inpatient errors (Kohn et al., 2000). The 
Institute extrapolated this figure from other research that included the landmark 
Harvard Medical Practice Study, which found that while serious medical errors 
occurred in only 3.7% of hospitalizations in New York in 1984, more than a quarter 
of the events were the result of negligence, and some events led to permanent 
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disability (2.6% of events) or death (13.6% of events) (Brennan et al., 2004). The 
Harvard study concluded that “There is a substantial amount of injury to patients 
from medical management, and any injuries are the result of substandard care” 
(Brennan et al., 2004: 145). 
A second study examined by the IOM found a slightly lower rate of adverse 
events in hospitalized patients in Colorado and Utah (2.9%) (Thomas et al., 1999), 
but concluded that, even using this lower figure, medical errors were the 7th leading 
cause of death at the time, exceeding deaths from “motor vehicle accidents, breast 
cancer or AIDS” (Kohn et al., 2000: 1). April Significantly, in both the Colorado/Utah 
and New York studies, slightly more than half of all adverse events were attributable 
to preventable error (Kohn et al., 2000). 
Surgical Error: An Important Type of Medical Error 
One important type of medical error is surgical error, and surgical errors 
themselves have subtypes. The definition of “surgical error” varies between states 
and health care monitoring organizations, but among those errors most commonly 
referenced are: 
1. Surgery on the wrong patient 
2. Surgery on the wrong body part 
3. Wrong surgical procedure 
4. Unintentionally retained foreign bodies after surgery 
5. Death of an ASA Class I patient during or immediately after surgery 
[ASA is the American Society of Anesthesiologists. ASA Class I 
patients are considered the healthiest patients with the lowest risk for 
anesthesia-related complications or reactions]  
Errors in surgery have been discovered to originate with individuals, systems, 
and work groups. Among the causes are: 
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 “Error in diagnosis 
o Misinterpretation of diagnostic test results 
o Failure to diagnose or misdiagnosis 
o Delayed diagnosis 
o Failure to perform diagnostic tests… 
 Error in treatment 
o Unnecessary treatment 
o Medication error 
o Delayed treatment 
o Technical error 
o Wrong treatment concept 
o Failure to treat… 
 Error in communication 
o Error in written communication 
o Error in verbal communication 
o Error in information handover… 
 Error in judgment 
o Inadequate planning of procedure 
o Wrong indication for procedure 
o Violation of guideline or protocol… 
 System issue 
o Time-out not performed 
o Environmental safety or security issue 
o Error in credentialing or competency 
o Error in supervision or staffing 
o Inadequate resources…” (Stahel et al., 2010: 981) 
 
 Surgical errors, while uncommon, have a significant personal and social 
impact. They are estimated to cost employers as much as $1.5 billion annually 
(AHRQ, 2008) and can be fatal. AHRQ estimates that 1 of every 10 patients who 
died within 90 days of surgery did so because of a preventable error, and Mehtsun, 
et al., found that “…6.6% of surgical never events result in the death of the patient” 
(Mehtsun et al., 2012: 5). Seiden and Barach note that, as with medical errors in 
general, the consequences of surgical errors can range from “…increased 
hospitalization and pain to serious iatrogenic injury and death,” and that surgical 
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errors frequently result in permanent patient injury and litigation awards that average 
$96,032 and have ranged as high as $9 million (Seiden and Barach, 2006: 935). 
Variation in the Incidence of Surgical Errors 
Estimates of the incidence of surgical errors vary by as much as eleven times 
(ranging from 0.4/10,000 surgeries to 4.5/10,000 surgeries), partly due to variation in 
definitions and types of reporting systems (Neily, 2011). Referring to one type of 
surgical error (wrong site surgery), Michaels, et al., report that “…we lack national 
estimates of the true incidence of wrong site operations, and little is known about 
hospital efforts to mitigate these preventable events” (Michaels et al., 2007: 526). 
Until now, there has been an ongoing lack of reliable data about the true 
incidence of wrong-patient and wrong-site operations because these 
confidential data—derived from closed claims, sentinel event database, or 
other types of surveys based on voluntary reporting—may represent just the 
tip of the iceberg of selected, most severe occurrences (Stahel, 2010: 979). 
Some data are available, however, that illustrate the risk of surgical error. The 
rate for adverse events occurring within the operating room in the Veterans Health 
Administration system is 0.4 per 10,000 surgeries (Neily, 2011). The American 
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons found that the chance of any given orthopedic 
surgeon performing wrong-site surgery is 25% over the course of 35 years (Stahel et 
al., 2010). Looking only at wrong-site and wrong-procedure occurrences, Stahel et 
al. also examined a prospective physician insurance database in Colorado covering 
January, 2002 through May, 2008 and identified 132 events during the period. 
Although such errors are uncommon, “The occurrence of a surgical never event can 
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be catastrophic for a patient and can also be destructive to a surgeon’s career and 
an institution’s reputation” (Mehtsun et al., 2012: 1). 
Seiden and Barach examined the National Practitioner Data Bank and found 
that between 1990 and 2003 there were at least: 
 2217 cases of “wrong body part surgery”  
 3723 cases of “wrong treatment/wrong procedure performed” 
 4295 cases of “retained foreign body”  
They state, however, that “the exact incidence and prevalence of WSPEs 
[wrong-side/wrong-site/wrong-procedure/wrong-patient events] remains unknown” 
(Seiden and Barach, 2006: 932). Extrapolating from a review of WSPEs at 17 
Minnesota hospitals in 2003 – 2004, however, they estimate that as many as 2760 
surgical errors occur in the United States annually. This number only includes 
extrapolating from three of the five common categories of surgical error, since they 
did not consider wrong patient or death of an ASA I patient.   
Efforts to Reduce Surgical Errors 
That surgical errors are numerous and devastating has long been recognized 
(Becher and Chassin, 2001) and has led to multiple efforts to reduce them. Among 
the most prominent actions taken have been the recommendations of the American 
College of Surgeons in 2002, which published recommendations to prevent wrong-
site, wrong patient, wrong-procedure events, and the Universal Protocol published 
by the Joint Commission in 2004 (Stahel, 2010). The Joint Commission Universal 
Protocol includes system interventions such as marking of a patient’s surgical site 
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and a pause before initiating surgery to verify that the correct procedure is being 
performed on the correct patient (Stahel, 2010).  
 Perhaps the most celebrated of the prevention efforts has been the adoption 
of the surgical checklist advanced by the World Health Organization. In trials in eight 
hospitals in different nations the use of the checklist was found to reduce surgical 
complications by 36% and deaths by 47% (Gawande, 2009). 
In spite of many efforts to reform surgery processes to prevent errors, 
however, they continue to occur, and “We have few data on how often and why they 
occur and on why the safety mechanisms in place fail to prevent them” (Seiden and 
Barach, 2006: 931). Stahel et al. note that “Despite the widespread implementation 
of the Universal Protocol in recent years, wrong-site surgery continues to pose a 
significant challenge to patient safety in the United States” (Stahel et al., 2010: 978-
979). Seiden and Barach report that “…one third of wrong-site surgery cases 
occurred even with careful site identification procedures…” (Seiden and Barach, 
2006: 937). 
It is recognized that the circumstances surrounding surgical errors are not 
easy to assess. “In complex systems, a single failure rarely leads to harm….When 
things go wrong, it is usually because a series of failures conspires to produce 
disaster” (Gawande, 2002). Surgical errors are the result of a “…series of individual 
errors” that requires an organization to be alert to the multiple factors that combine 
to create an opportunity for error and to plan for systemic responses that “…will 
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either prevent or anticipate and compensate for errors that human beings inevitably 
make” (Becher and Chassin, 2001: 75). 
 The Center for Transforming Healthcare agrees:  
 Since wrong site surgeries are relatively rare events, they are difficult to 
 study. Research has shown that there is usually no one root cause of failure. 
 Instead, such events are frequently the result of a cascade of small errors 
 that are able to penetrate organizational defenses. It is important to examine 
 the failures in an organization’s defenses to fully understand the event and 
 reduce the risk of future failures (Joint Commission Center for Transforming 
 Healthcare, 2011: 1).  
Ultimately, as with other medical errors, “The current health care system is 
not culturally or structurally organized for preventing” them (Seiden and Barach, 
2006: 935). A major complication in the effort to reduce medical errors is “A widely 
held view in society of error as indicative of incompetence [that] leads people in 
organizational hierarchies to systematically suppress mistakes and deny 
responsibility....Hierarchical structures thus discourage the kind of systematic 
analysis of mistakes that would allow people to better design systems to prevent 
them” (Edmondson, 1996: 9). Tucker and Edmondson agree that poor system 
design prevents learning from error (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003). 
Carroll and Edmondson state that health care institutions “…can improve 
quality and other outcomes by enhancing their capabilities for organizational 
learning…” a process that they describe as “…increasing the capacity for effective 
organizational action through knowledge and understanding” (Carroll and 
Edmondson, 2002: 51). They find that learning does not come naturally to 
organizations, however. Opportunities for information sharing and learning must be 
created, since they do not arise naturally within the organization.  
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Learning from Failure 
The complex web of causation behind surgical errors creates an imperative to 
understand and define the contributing factors that permit errors to occur. Such 
understanding in turn requires cooperation from the medical profession and hospital 
administrators. Progress, however, has been slow, at least in part because such 
cooperation cuts against the traditions of these institutions. Edmondson states that 
“…the culture of medicine more generally discourages admission of error, thereby 
greatly diminishing a given hospital’s potential to learn from mistakes, both 
consequential or not” (Edmondson, 2004: ii5). Tucker and Edmondson  concur that 
“…in spite of increased emphasis on these issues, hospitals are not learning from 
the daily problems and errors encountered by their workers…..process failures are 
not rare but rather are an integral part of working on the front lines of health care 
delivery” (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003: 56). 
 The possibility that hospitals (and by extension other health care institutions 
where surgery occurs) can learn from failure, however, is also acknowledged by 
Tucker and Edmondson: “Both errors and problems can be detected and used as 
launching points for organizational learning and improvements by motivating 
changes to avoid recurrence” (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003: 69). To accomplish 
this they argue against reliance on first-order [specific to the occurrence] problem 
solving alone, because it “…does not address underlying causes, thus not reducing 
the likelihood of a similar problem in the future....” and “…can preclude improvement 
by obscuring the existence of problems and errors and preventing operational and 
structural changes that would prevent the same failures from happening again” 
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(Tucker and Edmondson, 2003: 60 – 61). Because serious medical errors are rare, 
“…an individual health care facility cannot improve its performance unless its 
research goes beyond its own data….Hospitals may have to share data if they are to 
improve their performances” (West, 2006: 15). 
 The World Health Organization agrees. The WHO Draft Guidelines for 
Adverse Event Reporting and Learning Systems state that “Too often neither health-
care providers nor health-care organizations advise others when a mishap occurs, 
nor do they share what they have learned when an investigation has been carried 
out. As a consequence, the same mistakes occur repeatedly in many settings and 
patients continue to be harmed by preventable errors” (WHO, 2005: 7). 
Reporting of Surgical Errors 
One important means by which organizations are thought to learn to prevent 
errors is through reporting systems, and “…there has recently been increasing 
recognition of the need for healthcare organizations to monitor and learn from 
patient safety incidents” (Hutchinson et al., 2009: 5). This opportunity for 
improvement arises when errors are considered not only in the moment of their 
occurrence, by those who have intimate knowledge of the error, but when they are 
reported to authorities who can then assess the scope and severity of the problem, 
as well as provide greater objectivity and expertise in the appropriate preventive 
measures needed. As Mehtsun, et al., note:  
It is clear that we need a mandatory reporting system of surgical never 
 events that is not reliant on risk management or voluntary reporting. We also 
 need reporting systems that provide more root-cause information about each 
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 event so that safe hospital systems can be developed (Mehtsun et al., 
 2012: 6). 
Reporting systems are thought to be important because they “…have the 
potential to serve two important functions. They can hold providers accountable for 
performance or, alternatively, they can provide information that leads to improved 
safety” (Kohn, 2000: 86). Indeed, Chamberlain reports that in New Zealand, “One 
study showed incident reporting reduced the adverse event rate in hospitals and 
emergency department to a half and a quarter respectively over an 8-year period” 
(Chamberlain, 2008: 60). Thus, reporting of serious errors may help reduce future 
errors by creating an opportunity to investigate and learn from them (Hartnell et al., 
2012: 362). In addition, mandatory reporting requirements create a risk of possible 
public exposure of errors, which in turn is an incentive to reduce their incidence in 
order to prevent embarrassment.  
 Many organizations and governments have recognized the need to develop 
systems for reporting surgical errors. Becher and Chasin note that “State 
governments can also facilitate the collection, analysis, and public dissemination of 
key data on health care quality” (Becher and Chasin, 2001: 78). WHO agrees: “At a 
minimum, reporting can help identify hazards and risks, and provide information as 
to where the system is breaking down. This can help target improvement efforts and 
systems changes to reduce the likelihood of injury to future patients” (WHO, 2005: 
7). 
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State Medical Error Reporting Systems 
 The 1999 IOM report was a catalyst for the growth of state medical error 
reporting systems. In 2000 15 states had some type of reporting system in place, 
although they did not all focus on the serious events considered in this study. By 
2005, 23 states had some system in place for reporting medical errors, and the Joint 
Commission, as well as the National Quality Forum, had developed well-defined 
standardized lists of reportable errors, including surgical errors (Clarke, 2006).  
 The state error reporting landscape is subject to continuous modification 
through the addition of new state systems, deletion of other state systems, and 
adjustment of reportable events and reporting requirements. As of 2007, NASHP 
reported that four states had added mandatory reporting systems and eleven states 
extensively revised their systems in the period of 2005 – 2007 (Rosenthal and 
Takach, 2007). 
 By 2010, 27 states and the District of Columbia had some system for 
voluntary or mandatory reporting of medical errors (NASHP, 2011). The growth of 
mandatory reporting systems is demonstrated in Table 1-1 below.  
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Table 1-1: ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEMS IN 2000 AND 2007 
 
15 authorized adverse event 
reporting systems in 2000  
(including several that focused solely 
on abuse, neglect, or clinical outcomes, 
not adverse/patient safety events) 
 
27 authorized adverse event 
reporting systems in October 2007 
(only those systems that focus on 
adverse events with the intent to 
improve patient safety) 
Colorado, Florida, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Washington 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, Wyoming 
Source: Rosenthal and Takach (2007) 
 
 The current landscape of voluntary and mandatory medical error reporting 
programs is illustrated by Figure 1-1 below, based on important changes found in 
the course of this research since Table 1-1 was developed: the state of Wyoming 
ceased its program in 2010, Illinois’ program never functioned, and the state of New 
Hampshire has implemented a new program: 
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Figure 1-1: STATES WITH MEDICAL ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS IN 2012 
Source: Rosenthal and Takach (2007) modified by this research 
Key:    = mandatory reporting   = voluntary reporting 
 
 
 
 Types of reporting systems vary widely between states. The fundamental 
difference is whether medical error reporting is voluntary or mandatory. Each of 
these types has a particular purpose. The Institute of Medicine notes that mandatory 
systems exist mainly to enforce accountability for serious incidents that lead to injury 
or death. These systems are primarily located within state agencies with 
investigative and enforcement powers, and: 
 “…provide the public with a minimum level of protection by assuring that the 
most serious errors are reported and investigated and appropriate follow-up 
action is taken” 
 “…provide an incentive to health care organizations to improve patient safety 
in order to avoid the potential penalties and public exposure” and 
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 “…require all health care organizations to make some level of investment in 
patient safety, thus creating a more level playing field.” (Kohn, 2000: 86) 
 In contrast, voluntary reporting systems are intended to permit the review of 
incidents that result in minor harm or do not actually reach a patient. Such voluntary 
reports typically do not result in public disclosure or penalties. Their purpose is to 
“…identify and remedy vulnerabilities in systems before the occurrence of harm” 
(Kohn, 2000: 87). 
 Only mandatory medical error reporting systems are considered in this study, 
because the purpose of this research is to determine state agency perceptions 
regarding compliance with the reporting requirements.  
  
Fulfilling the Call of the IOM through a Cycle of Reporting and Feedback 
 If the reporting process functions ideally, the additional knowledge acquired 
by analysis of the error will generate recognition and learning at the level of the 
surgical episode, and future errors may be prevented. WHO states that “…if the 
event is reported and the findings from the investigation are entered into a database, 
the event can be aggregated with similar incidents to elucidate common underlying 
causes. A variety of solutions could emerge...” (WHO, 2005: 9). WHO finds that 
reporting can lead to improvements in several ways: 
1. By generating safety alerts 
2. Dissemination of lessons learned from errors 
3. Analysis can reveal patterns of errors 
4. Aggregation of data can lead to recommendations for improved practice 
(WHO, 2005). 
The feedback loop is vital to the efficacy of the reporting process. Clarke 
notes that “Feedback…motivates reporting….An effective reporting system must not 
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only capture system errors, it must also use them to drive improvement in the 
system of healthcare delivery. Effective analysis is the other critical component of a 
patient safety reporting system” (Clarke, 2006:1089).  
In an effective error reporting system, the stakeholders include the medical 
professions, hospitals, governmental authorities, and the public. Each party requires 
information in order to make informed judgments regarding the nature and cause of 
surgical errors. The system relies upon the honest and complete reporting of error 
data, from operating room to hospital administration, to governmental authority, to 
the public and back to the providers.  
Figure 1-2 illustrates a model error reporting system that returns critical 
information back to medical providers in order to use learning to prevent future 
surgical errors. The model was adapted for this study from performance 
improvement models that emphasize a closed feedback loop, an example of which 
is the “Plan-Do-Study-Act” strategy (Langley et al., 1996), and from the WHO 
Guidelines that include the note that “…a reporting system must produce a visible, 
useful response by the receiver to justify the resources expended in reporting, or, for 
that matter, to stimulate individuals or institutions to report. The response system is 
more important than the reporting system” (WHO, 2005: 12). 
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Figure 1-2: MODEL CYCLE OF SURGICAL ERROR REPORTING AND 
FEEDBACK TO PREVENT FUTURE ERRORS THROUGH LEARNING 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 Each of these steps is worthy of study to identify vulnerabilities and 
opportunities to strengthen the system. Step 2 is one of the two intersection points 
between the institutional and governmental processes in the cycle (the other point 
being Step 5). This study is concentrated on the role of the governmental authority in 
the process, and the perceptions and responses of managers to institutional failures 
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to report errors as required. Therefore, the focus of this study was Step 2, although 
data were generated that also illuminate processes downstream from Step 2 as well. 
Failure Points in the Cycle of Error Reporting and Feedback 
The chain of reporting surgical errors is vulnerable. At each step in the 
process there are multiple players and multiple opportunities to misunderstand or 
overlook the error itself or the need to report the error, and each of the process steps 
in this cycle is susceptible to failure through lack of data input. As the cycle 
progresses the risk of failure increases because each step relies on the data inputs 
and processes in the previous steps. As a result, the opportunities for learning and 
performance improvement offered by the system are subject to multiple failure 
points. When events are not reported, critical opportunities to learn how to prevent 
future surgical errors may be lost.  
Figure 1-3 illustrates points in the Cycle of Surgical Error Reporting and 
Feedback where the flow of information may be blocked and cause system failure. 
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Figure 1-3: FAILURE POINTS IN THE CYCLE OF SURGICAL ERROR 
REPORTING AND FEEDBACK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examples of failures at each of these process steps include: 
Step 1: Report of error through internal facility processes. Institutional 
personnel who become aware of an error may fail to follow policy to report the error 
internally. 
Step 2: Official external report of error to governmental authority where 
required. The institutional authority may fail to report the error to the governmental 
authority for many reasons described in the literature review, including fear of 
negative consequences, uncertainty regarding reporting requirements, perception of 
lack of value in reporting, and lack of awareness of the error occurrence. 
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Step 3: Data delivered for aggregation and analysis in states where this is 
conducted. States may fail to process data in a meaningful way, including failure to 
deliver the necessary data to personnel with the skills and awareness of the issues 
required for effective data analysis and summaries. 
Step 4: Data prepared for public release in states where this is conducted. In 
those states where data are aggregated, analyzed and then publicly released, the 
release of data may be compromised by lack of resources, lack of appropriate 
information outlets, or low prioritization of this step. 
Step 5: Data delivered to institutions in states where this is conducted. Data 
may be released in a format that is not useful to institutions, including “summary 
only” data, data missing causative analysis, or data not reaching specific institutions 
with an interest in process improvement. 
Step 6: Internal facility review and process adjustments. The institutions 
receiving data may be incapable, unwilling or uninterested in using the data to 
review and improve internal processes designed to prevent future errors. 
 Lack of resources and failures of organization structure may also occur at 
every step.  
 Each of these steps is worthy of study to identify vulnerabilities and 
opportunities to strengthen the system. A great investment has been made in 
discovering the reasons for the failure of Step 1, and as the literature review will 
show, there has also been some research investigating possible reasons for failure 
in Step 2, which is the focus of this study. Loss of information at each handoff in the 
cycle results in further loss of learning downstream. The point at which health care 
entities must report a surgical error to state authorities is critical to the successful 
flow of data at all subsequent points in the system. 
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Research into the Failure of Step 2 
As error reporting systems began to proliferate starting in the early 2000s, 
expectations were high. “As states adopt the serious reportable events list…the data 
on medical errors will become more and more reliable, with the ability to spot trends 
and regional problems (American Health Consultants, 2001: 162).  
However, some research has found that many reportable medical errors are 
not reported (Gottleib, 2004). Review of medical records in two states found many 
more reportable errors than actual official error reports. In Washington State, a 
collaboration between Hearst Newspapers and the Niagara Health Quality Coalition 
utilized retrospective medical record review to determine that as many as 2200 
serious errors should be reported in Washington annually, but only about 200 events 
were actually reported (Nalder, 2010). A similar discovery was made in Nevada, 
where billing data showed that: 
 1,363 occurrences statewide that fit the definition of grave, reportable 
 medical errors in 2008 and 2009. But Nevada hospitals reported to state 
 health officials 402 serious errors for those years. A subsequent review by 
 the state found some serious hospital mistakes weren't reported (Mullen, 
 2011). 
 
Noncompliance with reporting requirements can begin at the surgical episode 
and extend through the institutional management. The Inspector General of the 
Department of Health and Human Services reported that “93 percent of serious 
adverse events in hospitals went undetected by the hospitals’ own internal reporting 
systems” (Nalder, 2010). Responsibility for maintaining an effective cycle of 
reporting and improvement also lies with the state agencies that receive error 
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reports. Governmental authority plays a critical part in the cycle of error reporting, 
analysis and feedback. This role is under-evaluated, as the literature review will 
show.  
Study Questions and Aims 
 
 This study is intended to illuminate questions of what states perceive to be 
the effectiveness of their medical error reporting programs, the extent and urgency 
of under-reporting and what approaches they take in using reported data to reduce 
surgical errors. This study will concentrate on surgical errors because the definition 
of reportable medical error varies widely between the states, but many states either 
use the NQF definition of surgical errors or have developed their own definitions that 
are quite similar. At least at the level of defined reportable error, surgical errors are a 
fairly consistent category for exploration of medical error reporting systems in 
various states. 
 As the literature review will demonstrate, barriers to reporting surgical errors 
have been reported from the perspective of health care institutions. Little, however, 
is currently known about the perceptions held by state agencies regarding barriers to 
surgical error reporting and the risk of under-reporting. Because the error reporting 
system plays an important role in the prevention of future errors, it is important to 
understand the beliefs of state agencies regarding potential under-reporting, and the 
states’ perception of their role in managing reporting compliance. 
 The fundamental research questions in this study are:  
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1. What are the states’ perceptions of compliance with mandatory reporting of 
surgical errors? 
 
2. What are the perceptions of state agencies regarding barriers to reporting of  
surgical errors?  
 
3. If states believe under-reporting is occurring, what is their level of concern 
about  it? 
 
4. If states believe under-reporting is occurring, what are they doing about it? 
 
5. What are the states doing with their reported error data to improve healthcare 
Quality? 
 
6. What feedback do states give to providers regarding reported errors? 
 
7. How do state agencies perceive their role in enforcing reporting 
requirements? 
 
 The unit of analysis and sample size, which will be described more fully in 
Chapter 3, were the twenty five state government agencies that receive and process 
reports of surgical errors from health care institutions. The study utilized qualitative 
methods, which do not require a hypothesis. Instead, the qualitative methodology 
illuminates perceptions and processes that help to answer the research questions. 
Significance of this Study 
 As the literature review will demonstrate, little is known of the perceptions of 
state agencies regarding potential under-reporting of surgical errors and their role in 
the enforcement of error reporting requirements. By locating the state within the 
error reporting cycle and examining state perceptions of, and responses to, possible 
error under-reporting, this study contributes to the understanding of the role of the 
regulatory agency in preventing medical errors and increasing patient safety in 
several ways. It:  
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1. Provides previously unknown information about state agency 
perceptions of the risks of medical error under-reporting 
 
2. Provides previously unknown information about state agency 
perceptions of barriers to medical error reporting 
 
3. Provides previously unknown information about state agency 
perceptions of their role in enforcing medical error reporting 
requirements and using reported data to improve patient safety 
 
4. Results in a plan for change that includes enhancements to the error 
reporting systems that may increase the data available for review and 
can broaden and deepen the knowledge available to providers on the 
causes and prevention of surgical errors.  
 
 Because continued improvement in the incidence of surgical errors relies in 
large part on the learning acquired through study of reported errors, noncompliance 
with surgical error reporting is a cause for concern. The successful functioning of all 
of the segments of the reporting system is critical for the completion of the learning 
cycle as efforts continue to reduce the incidence of medical errors. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Extensive study, analysis and intervention have been conducted on the health 
care institution side of the medical error reporting system, where errors actually 
occur. Researchers have examined the training, competence, teamwork, work and 
stress levels, communication, human factors issues and many other aspects 
involved in the actual commission of surgical errors in an effort to reduce their 
incidence. One of the profound results of this work has been the World Health 
Organization Safe Surgery Checklist, the use of which has been associated with 
major reductions in surgical errors around the globe (Gawande, 2009).  
The act of reporting errors has received some research attention as well, but 
it focuses primarily on actions inside health care institutions: the individuals who 
commit or observe an error, and whether they recognize and report errors to their 
institutional authorities. Less data are available regarding the regulatory side of the 
error reporting systems, where institutions report to the governmental authorities, 
and the governmental authorities analyze and report the data back to the industry 
and to the public.  
Benn found that “Limited research evidence exists concerning the issue of 
effective forms of safety feedback within healthcare,” but that the establishment of 
effective feedback mechanisms may permit the diffusion of knowledge that “…may 
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be usefully employed to promote safety awareness, improve clinical processes and 
promote future reporting” (Benn, 2009: 11). The issue of potential noncompliance 
with medical error reporting rules therefore requires an examination of barriers, both 
real and perceived, in the reporting process. This literature review was conducted to 
determine what barriers to surgical error reporting are cited by health care 
institutions and state regulatory agencies. 
 The published literature on the subject of state perceptions of their own 
reporting systems is meager. Little is available regarding the state agencies’ 
perceptions of the strength of the reporting relationship, the agencies’ enforcement 
roles, the degree of health care industry non-compliance, and attitudes within the 
state agencies to their place in the reporting cycle.  
 The primary source of published information regarding these questions is the 
National Academy for State Health Policy (NASHP), which has issued 11 reports on 
the subject since 2000. These reports are valuable for describing the various state 
systems, their legislative mandates, their approaches to defining reportable events 
and collecting, managing, analyzing and distributing data. However, almost no 
research conducted by NASHP or any other individual or agency has been found on 
the subject of state attitudes toward compliance with their own reporting systems. 
One relevant NASHP study regarding state perceptions is noted below.  
 Literature is presented first, however, that describes what is known about 
barriers and facilitators to reporting as perceived by health care entities, in order to 
demonstrate the challenges that states face when implementing mandatory reporting 
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systems and to identify points of potential weakness and leverage in the error 
reporting relationship. 
  A crucial aspect of this study is determining whether state agencies recognize 
these challenges and are actively responding to them. The major themes developed 
in the literature review appear again in the study results section in a matrix 
comparing them against the themes arising from the key informant interviews. This 
comparison permits an evaluation of whether the perceptions of industry and those 
of the regulatory agencies are congruent. 
 
Institutional Barriers to Reporting in the Literature 
Efforts to determine the causes of errors in the surgical environment have 
been productive, and analysis of barriers to reporting of errors from the surgical 
environment to the institutional authorities, such as hospital administration, have 
revealed training, trust and other issues (Hughes, 2008). Relatively little research, 
however, has been conducted regarding barriers to reporting of surgical errors to 
governmental authorities by the health care institutions where the errors occurred.  
The published literature discussed here reveals some similarities between 
reluctance of providers and institutions to report errors, primarily around legal and 
reputational issues. Significant differences are also apparent, however, with 
individual providers reporting many concerns related to institutional culture and 
personnel issues while institutional leaders focused more on regulatory uncertainty 
and relationships between the institutions and governmental authority, as well as 
stronger concern for exposure to liability as a consequence of disclosure. 
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As is the case regarding state perceptions of their own reporting systems, 
literature is scarce on the larger subject of institutional barriers to mandatory surgical 
error reporting between health care entities and regulators. Therefore, the literature 
review was broadly designed to capture as many available published articles and 
studies on the subject as could reasonably be accomplished. Both descriptive and 
analytical studies were considered for this review, and both qualitative and 
quantitative data were accepted. No hierarchy of evidence, such as that in which 
randomized control trials are pre-eminent, was employed.  
Many of the retrieved articles, while relevant, did not rely on primary or 
secondary evidence for their specific conclusions regarding the phenomenon of 
institutional reporting to governmental authorities. These articles were grouped into 
the categories “Issues Overviews” and “Editorials and Commentary” in order to 
emphasize that their perspectives are not explicitly founded in evidence presented or 
cited in the studies. Their place to this literature review arises through their 
contribution to a general consensus regarding the nature of barriers and the need for 
system improvements. Although the conclusions found in the Issues Overviews and 
Editorials and Commentaries are not grounded in presented data, the consistency of 
perspective found in these articles is notable. 
The broad search strategy employed here over-emphasizes sensitivity at the 
expense of specificity, but this effect is desirable when so little research is available 
for examination. Extensive title and abstract review of the captured articles was used 
to apply more specific inclusion and exclusion criteria. The search was not date-
restricted, because study of the reporting of surgical errors, like the reporting itself, is 
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a fairly recent phenomenon. Results were accepted from research conducted 
outside the United States, because lessons from the interaction of medical practice 
and governmental regulation may be illuminating regardless of the country 
considered. The only search limitation applied was [language = English]. 
The captured articles were a rich source of additional references, both 
because references to external error reporting were frequently embedded within an 
article that had a slightly different primary emphasis, and because the additional 
articles had not been captured by the original search terms. Including both the 
original search and the snowballing results, 32 journal articles were reviewed. Each 
article in the final selection was read twice to capture its type, methods and findings 
and to ensure that barriers to external reporting were defined or suggested. Tabular 
analysis was used to categorize the articles by strength of research method and 
details of processes and findings. 
Many of the articles, referred to positive requirements for effective external 
reporting as well as to negative barriers. These positive statements may imply 
negative barriers (e.g. “effective reporting systems must be confidential” implies that 
lack of confidentiality can be considered a barrier to reporting), and therefore the 
positive requirements, which are remarkably consistent between the articles, are 
presented in addition to explicit negative barriers that were identified.  
Analysis of the Literature 
The articles that were retrieved were largely descriptive in nature. Many were 
overviews of the history and types of error reporting systems. Analytical studies and 
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systematic literature reviews were included, but like the overview articles their 
insights on external reporting barriers sometimes took the form of assertions or 
statements that were either not supported by the studies’ data, or were supported by 
research that was actually conducted on a different subject. When this was the case, 
these analytic studies were included in the Issues Overviews or the Editorials and 
Commentary category. Likewise, several commentaries were found that made 
claims to external reporting barriers that were only lightly supported.  
This presents questions regarding validity of many of the articles, which will 
be discussed below. However, some of the cross-sectional studies and retrospective 
reviews that were identified, as well as several systematic literature reviews, 
considered the subject of barriers to external reporting in an explicit manner.  
A recurring feature of many of these articles is that reporting systems in the 
USA differ significantly in structure from those in the UK, Australia, and several other 
countries. In the USA practitioners report errors to their facility administration, which 
then reports to the government agencies where required. In many other nations the 
reporting systems permit practitioners to enter errors directly into a government 
database, eliminating the mediating effect of the institution. Many of the barriers 
identified in other countries to error reporting actually refer to hesitancy by 
practitioners, rather than institutions, and therefore correspond to internal barriers in 
the USA. However, there remains some relevance to the question of external 
barriers since external reports in the USA rely significantly on internal processes. 
The barriers mentioned in the articles from the UK and Australia are considered, but 
with awareness of the structural differences in those systems. 
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The results of the systematic literature review were: 
  
 Descriptive and Analytic studies (n = 8) 
 Systematic literature reviews (n = 2) 
 Issue overviews (n = 15 (including 2 analytic studies moved to this 
category)) 
 Editorials and commentary (n = 7 (including 2 analytic studies moved 
to this category)) 
 
Major Themes in the Literature 
Taken as a whole, the barriers identified in all categories of literature 
reviewed include these major areas and subtopics (number of articles mentioning 
each theme in parentheses): 
1. Policy issues  
a. Mandatory or voluntary reporting systems (4)  
b. Legal and civil liability risks and protections (8) 
c. Legal discovery risks and protections (8) 
d. Negative publicity or consequences of public disclosure (11) 
e. Protection from, or risk of, professional retribution (4) 
f. Confidentiality guarantees or lack of confidentiality (5) 
g. Lack of state enforcement or resources (3) 
 
2. System issues 
a. Degree of clarity of reporting requirements (6) 
b. System ease of use (4) 
c. Control over information (1) 
d. Perceived value in reporting data, including effective analysis and 
feedback (7) 
e. Stakeholder involvement in system design (3) 
f. Ongoing training in system requirements and use (1) 
g. Inclusion of safety tools as part of the reporting process (1) 
 
3. Internal issues 
a. Institutional culture (safety- or blame-oriented) (5) 
b. Effectiveness of internal error reporting and control systems (1) 
c. Institutional leadership on reporting (1) 
d. Staff turnover (1) 
e. Burden of reporting (1) 
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The results of the literature review are organized by the themes arising in the 
stronger of the studies, and by general synopses of the points made in the Issues 
Overviews and Editorials and Commentary. 
Themes Arising in the Descriptive and Analytic Studies 
Seven studies were identified that were either conducted explicitly on the 
subject of external reporting and its barriers, or drew supported conclusions on the 
subject from the data. The studies are summarized in Table 2-1. In addition, two 
systematic literature reviews addressed the topic explicitly.  
Theme 1: Policy Issues  
Policy issues were discussed extensively in most of the relevant literature. 
Policy issues, for the purposes of this review, include discussion of barriers or 
benefits inherent in different system types and structures. 
Several studies directly questioned institutional users about external reporting 
of errors.  Weissman et al. (2005) interviewed senior management in 203 hospitals, 
including those from:  
1. states with mandatory reporting systems with public disclosure 
2. states with mandatory reporting systems without public disclosure 
3. states without mandatory reporting systems 
 
They found that most hospital administrators felt that external, mandatory 
reporting systems would discourage internal reporting of errors within the hospitals, 
and more than three quarters of the administrators felt that mandatory external 
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reporting systems encouraged lawsuits. Not surprisingly, then, hospital leaders 
strongly endorsed confidentiality for both hospitals and practitioners involved.  
Direct analysis of reported errors also provided an opportunity for several 
researchers to examine the barriers inherent in the reporting process. Flink et al. 
compared voluntary error reports made to JCAHO and mandatory reports entered 
into the New York error reporting system, NYPORTS. Wrong site surgery had a 
clear correspondence as a defined reporting category in both JCAHO and 
NYPORTS. 104 cases of wrong site surgery had been entered in NYPORTS from 
June 1, 2000 to December 31, 2003, while there were only 300 nationwide reports 
made to JCAHO between 1995 and 2003. They concluded that “the comparison of 
the number of reports in a mandatory system (NYPORTS) versus a voluntary 
system (JCAHO) shows the potential utility of mandatory reporting,” implying that the 
voluntary nature of the JCAHO reporting system is in itself a possible barrier to 
reporting (Flink et al., 2005: 142). 
The question of whether the voluntary or mandatory nature of a system may 
itself be a barrier to reporting was also examined by Morton et al., (2006) who 
compared nationwide voluntary and mandatory reporting systems (mandatory 
claims-based vs. voluntary quality-based) to determine which system recorded more 
incidents of  specific surgical complications in the same population over the same 
period. Reports of two specific complications were significantly different between the 
two systems, with the voluntary system showing reports of fewer “other pulmonary” 
complications and more arrhythmias. Their conclusions are equivocal. Both systems 
were limited by data accuracy and completeness problems, but the voluntary system 
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had lower provider participation and was prone to the risk of editing patient 
outcomes when logging complications into the system.  
 Russell et al. sought to understand the quality of data on surgical mortality. 
They examined over 3300 abstracts of studies related to the monitoring of 
postoperative mortality. Their relevant conclusion for the purposes of this review was 
that “Reluctance to treat high-risk patients when mortality rates were made public 
was reported from North America” (Russell et al., 2003: 930). This finding was 
specific to the literature on cardiac surgery, however, and mortality rates are not the 
same as error rates. Still, the impact of publication of outcomes data on provider 
willingness to treat is relevant to the discussion of errors that may be disclosed to 
the public. 
Fassett (2006) examined the research that was the impetus for the passage 
of the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA). A key 
feature of this act is the ability of states to create Patient Safety Organizations 
(PSOs) that can receive voluntary quality data from institutions in return for “legal 
protections against unauthorized disclosure…” These data are also protected from 
legal discovery in most civil, criminal and administrative cases. Fassett notes that 
“The PSQIA is best seen as an attempt to remove an often-cited barrier to provider 
reporting of errors for use in quality improvement programs (i.e., fear that the 
information will be used in a lawsuit or disciplinary hearing against the provider)” 
(Fassett, 2006: 922). 
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Theme 2: System Issues 
System issues were not reported as widely as policy issues, but they did arise 
in several of the captured studies. System issues, for the purposes of this review, 
include discussion of barriers or benefits inherent in different system types and 
structures. 
In contrast to fears of liability and a perception of lack of clarity and 
usefulness in the USA, Spigelman and Swan (2005) administered a satisfaction 
survey to twelve institutional users of AIMS, the Australian Incident Monitoring 
System. They found that the major limitations of the system for users were 
“…frustrations around the limited reporting capabilities and the lack of control over 
the database to modify reports for individual user needs” (Spigelman and Swan, 
2005: 659). 
Flink observed that “One of the most critical lessons learned is that 
information gathered into the system must be meaningful and useful to those who 
are reporting events,” (Flink et al., 2005: 148) while Weissman, et al., found that 
twenty-three per cent of hospital leaders “…from the mandatory reporting states 
thought that reporting criteria were not very clear or not at all clear” (Weissman et 
al., 2005: 1363). 
Theme 3: Internal Institutional Issues 
Internal institutional issues, for the purposes of this review, include discussion 
of barriers or benefits inherent in different system types and structures. Internal 
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institutional issues were not reported as widely as policy issues, but they also arose 
in several of the studies. 
In the UK, where providers enter error data directly into the national database, 
Hutchinson, et al., (2009) analyzed incident and error reports in 148 hospitals that 
had reported at least one event into the national system from April 2004 – November 
2005. Reporting rates were generated and compared with positive responses on a 
safety culture survey administered at the same hospitals at approximately the same 
time as the events were reported. The researchers found that “The significant 
correlations between reporting rates and staff survey responses over two 
consecutive years (2004 and 2005) suggest that staff perceptions of the culture of 
safety and reporting within their hospital influence the actual number of reports being 
made” (Hutchinson et al., 2009: 8). 
Likewise, Tuttle, et al. (2002) reviewed their own hospital’s ICD-9 data to 
determine whether additional state-reportable incidents could be identified beyond 
those already reported as required. After 560 completed retrospective record 
reviews, they conclude “Hospitals that code more aggressively (assigning 
postoperative complications codes) than others could show an artificially high rate of 
postoperative events” (Tuttle et al., 2002: 357). This suggests that internal 
processes that intensify a medical outcome might be a factor in reporting. Specific 
barriers to mandatory reporting were not identified, however. 
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Flink noted that, in addition to factors noted above, “The turnover of hospital 
staff affects reporting rates and the quality of the reports submitted” (Flink et al., 
2005: 149). 
Summary of the Descriptive and Analytic Studies 
Policy issues dominated the literature in the studies that included original 
research. Weissman, et al., conclude that “…most hospital leaders had serious 
reservations about these systems. On balance, hospital leaders believed that 
mandatory, nonconfidential state reporting systems as designed discouraged 
internal reporting of medical errors and led to a greater frequency of lawsuits while 
failing to provide substantial benefit to patient safety….hospital leaders resoundingly 
favored confidentiality….….many hospital leaders perceived a lack of clarity…” 
(Weissman et al., 2005: 1364). 
It should be noted that Weissman, et al. surveyed hospital chief executives, 
chief operating officers and chief medical officers. In some hospitals, these positions 
may have a direct role to play in the external reporting of medical errors. In many 
hospitals, however, the reporting of errors is the domain of the risk manager or 
hospital compliance officer, positions that were not included in this survey. 
Flink, who found that a system with mandatory reporting (NYPORTS) was 
more likely than a voluntary reporting system (JCAHO) to capture events, concluded 
with lessons learned for the success of such a system, including: 
1. “Making the system legally required, with protection from discovery 
2. Developing the system collaboratively, including all stakeholders in the 
system’s design and implementation 
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3. Clear and objective definitions of reporting criteria as a basis for collecting 
accurate and consistent data  
4. Ongoing training and educational support for system users; and  
5. Having a stakeholder advisory group for ongoing assessment and 
recommendations, ensuring the system’s relevance and 
viability….Ultimately, the success of the system also requires that users 
received feedback regarding their own performance” (Flink et al., 2005: 
149). 
 
By stating these essential elements for system success, they again imply that 
their opposites may result in system failure. 
The conclusions of these studies were largely supported by those of Barach 
and Small (2000), who interviewed directors of error and incident reporting systems 
in various non-health care industries.  They conclude:  
Examination of successful non-medical domains indicates that the following 
factors are important in determining the quality of incident reports and the 
success of incident reporting systems: immunity (as far as practical); 
confidentiality or data de-identification (making data untraceable to 
caregivers, patients, institutions, time); independent outsourcing of report 
collection and analysis by peer experts; rapid meaningful feedback to 
reporters and all interested parties; ease of reporting and sustained 
leadership support (Barach and Small, 2000: 761). 
 
Issue Overviews 
 Thirteen articles were essentially overviews and summaries of the history and 
issues related to medical error reporting. In addition, two analytical studies are 
placed in this category because their conclusions about barriers to external reporting 
are derived from research other than their own. These overviews stated both 
negative barriers and positive requirements for reporting systems. There was 
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remarkable consistency in the positive and negative attributes of error reporting 
systems between the articles and between national systems. 
Summaries of reporting systems and issues in the USA identified these 
positive aspects of successful systems: 
 Freedom from retribution (Seiden and Barach, who note “After a near miss in 
clinical care, clinicians in Florida are at risk of paying significant fines and of 
performing community service. This practice has had a chilling effect on 
reporting and patient safety programs in the state” (Seiden and Barach, 2006: 
938)).  
 
 “Rapid, nonpunitive, confidential, simple, and demonstrably beneficial” 
(Spencer, 2000: 417). 
 
 Public dissemination of data (Becher and Chassin, 2001). 
 
 Safe, simple, worthwhile (Leape, 2002). 
 
 Confidential, supportive of a culture of safety, and disseminated knowledge 
about how to use the system, executive level dedication to reporting, 
knowledge of reporting requirements, two-way communication between 
agencies and institutions, awareness of how external reporting is beneficial 
(Wood and Nash, 2005). 
 
These negative barriers were noted: 
 Events are rare and “so devastating they are often not disclosed openly,” and 
(relating to aspergillus arising from a hospital construction project) 
“…presumably due to litigation and risk to program operations, the 
phenomenon is not addressed much in a public forum” (Larson, 2002: 997-
998). 
 
 No feedback and no trend-tracking. Public disclosure and litigation. Lack of 
state resources (Leape, 2002). 
 
 “…health care facilities face major deterrents to revealing mistakes. Reporting 
can result in fines or even loss of accreditation for a health care facility” 
(Stow, 2006: 411). 
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 Concern that information will be used in a punitive manner against physicians; 
uncertainty about requirements, lack of state enforcement, a culture of non-
reporting, fear of liability and fear of publicity (Robeznieks, 2004). 
 
Barriers to reporting in Australia were found to include:  
 Concerns for job security, the views of other professionals, inhibitive reporting 
cultures, lack of adequate systems and “patterns of sociologically implicit or 
explicit discouragement or blaming mores” (Braithwaite et al., 2008: 185). 
 
In New Zealand, the barriers included: 
 Fear, medical culture, Individual counterincentives, organizational 
embarrassment, knowledge of the importance of the issue (Chamberlain, 
2008). 
 
The UK was no different. Barriers included:  
 Lack of engagement from doctors and lack of knowledge of how to access 
incident form (Mahajan, 2010). 
 
 “…mandatory systems deter practitioners and hospitals from reporting 
incidents as they fear public disclosure will lead to possible comeback for the 
reporting physician or trust” (Panesar, Cleary, and Sheikh, 2009:256). (Note 
that two issues are collapsed into one in this statement: mandatory systems 
and public disclosure). 
 
 A system should be developed in the historical, incentive and political context 
of its country. It should be mandatory and national; it should exist alongside 
supporting safety tools and incentives to promote a sense of safe reporting; 
learning and dissemination systems should be parallel; new safety 
interventions should be developed; front line compliance should be 
strategized; candor should be encouraged, along with anonymity (Williams 
and Osborn, 2006). 
 
In the Netherlands the same issues were addressed: 
 “We must adopt a system of blame free reporting…Fear of being dragged 
before a medical disciplinary board must not be an impediment” (Sheldon, 
2004, quoting Netherlands Healthcare Inspector General, Herre Kingma).  
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As they were in Greece: 
 “…such events often lead to long lasting internal investigations from the 
hospital’s manager or end up in the press or in the courts, with adverse 
consequences for a doctor, a hospital or for the Health Care System” 
(Vozikis, 2009: 21). 
 
Summary of Issue Overviews 
 Although the issues overviews are so categorized because they do not 
consist of original research, their assertions and conclusions are consistent with 
those of the descriptive and analytic studies reviewed above. In particular, there is 
great emphasis on the risk to institutions and individuals of reporting. Cultures of 
safety and governmental resources merit a mention, but by far the greater 
discussion relates to legal and civil liability and to the public embarrassment to which 
providers and institutions may be exposed as a result of reporting.  
Editorials and Commentary 
 Seven editorials or commentaries ((Dovey, 2004), (Zivin and Pfaff, 2004), 
(Cohen, 2000), (Bates et al., 2003), (Wheeland, 2005, in (Coldiron et al., 2005)), 
(Balkrishnan, Gill, Vallee, & Feldman, 2003) and (Flowers and Riley, 2001)) 
consisted of assertions about what constitutes barriers to error reporting or what 
aspects of a reporting system will encourage reporting, including two analytic studies 
that veered into editorial when discussing external reporting barriers. The lack of 
references or research to support these assertions leaves them with little weight, but 
their similarity to the issues already described helps paint a picture of the issue as 
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one that has perhaps neared a point of consensus, and helps determine whether the 
consensus is well-founded.  
 The elements of the editorials are not described further, but are included in 
the summary in Table 2-2. 
Studies Specific to State Agency Perceptions and Responses 
The reports of the NASHP are the primary reference available regarding the 
history, structure and mandates of the various state reporting systems. What little is 
found regarding state perceptions of under-reporting appears in one NASHP report 
that specifically surveyed state agency perceptions of the causes under-reporting.  
The perspective of state error reporting system administrators was examined 
by Marchev et al. (2003), who studied the question of public disclosure of reported 
errors by analyzing the data release practices of states with mandatory error 
reporting. Telephone interviews were conducted with the responsible managers of 
19 states. They found that “All states with mandatory systems… recounted a 
problem with under reporting.” Among the barriers to event reporting mentioned by 
the states were: 
1. “A lack of effective internal systems within hospitals to identify 
incidents 
2. Unclear definitions or requirements for what must be reported 
3. Reporting burden and a lack of perceived usefulness by facilities 
4. Fear of liability and negative publicity creates a culture of non-
reporting, and  
5. A lack of enforcement at the state level” (Marchev et al., 2003: 20). 
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They observe, interestingly, that “Many states noted that they provide data 
protection in the interest of achieving a high level of compliance. However, since all 
of the states with mandatory reporting systems describe under reporting as a 
problem, the connection between protection of data and under reporting is not an 
easy one to draw” (Marchev et al., 2003: 20). 
It is notable that Marchev found that state agency managers named many of 
the same concerns that hospital administrators and researchers working at the 
institutional level also mentioned. Marchev’s findings suggest that state agencies 
should acknowledge underreporting and should express an understanding of the 
health care industry’s perceptions of the causes of underreporting. This study tests 
this suggestion. 
 The survey by Marchev comprises the entire published literature located on 
the subject of state agency perceptions of compliance with medical error reporting 
requirements.  
Discussion 
Literature on the cause and prevention of medical errors is enormous, and on 
the identification and reporting of errors to internal authorities is quite large. The 
literature addressing barriers to external reporting of medical errors is, by contrast, 
minimal. Little original research was found specifically addressing barriers to 
external reporting. That which was located was either fairly narrow (e.g. interviews of 
hospital administrators regarding their opinions of reporting systems), was specific to 
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certain state systems, or was founded in the experience of other countries with 
different reporting systems.  
Four studies, however, consisted of retrospective reviews of reported 
incidents in several contrasting systems, which permitted a comparison of voluntary 
and involuntary reporting rules and tested the reliability of hospital data. These 
studies concluded that voluntary systems, and those that rely on spontaneous 
reporting rather than automated reporting, may lead to underreporting of errors. 
They also found that internal barriers, such as coding and reporting structures within 
a hospital and turnover of hospital personnel, may affect external reporting 
compliance, and a culture of safety within an institution may be associated with 
increased rates of reported errors, and is thus likely a facilitator of reporting. 
Three cross-sectional surveys of hospital and state agency personnel were 
revealing in their consistency. Those who manage hospitals, those who work at the 
patient-care level, and those who administer external reporting programs within state 
governments agreed that major concerns about error reporting related to where the 
data were going, how it would be used, and whether it was publicly disclosable or 
legally discoverable. Most hospital administrators felt that reporting requirements 
would not succeed whether they were mandatory or voluntary, while some state 
agency administrators thought that internal hospital systems were weak. Both sides 
agreed that a lack of perceived value or usefulness of the data and a lack of clarity 
regarding reporting requirements were obstacles to compliance. 
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The two systematic literature reviews that were located reached few 
conclusions about barriers to external reporting. They did find that concerns about 
legal liability, and a consequent recommendation that data be protected from 
discovery, were important. They also noted that public disclosure could have 
unanticipated negative effects, such as a reluctance to care for high-risk patients. 
By contrast, many overviews of the issue have been published, along with 
editorials and commentary urging one approach or another. The overviews tend 
toward a broader, historical perspective, and perhaps as a consequence they 
discuss a wider range of barriers and recommendations. By far the most common 
barriers mentioned in the issue overviews were public disclosure and its consequent 
embarrassment to institutions or individual providers, the related issues of 
discoverability and confidentiality/anonymity, and internal hospital cultures. 
Internal institution issues, which are relevant to this discussion because 
internal error reporting is the beginning of the external error reporting process, were 
not mentioned often in the original research. They were discussed in issues 
overviews and editorials, particularly in terms of institutional cultures of shame and 
blame or of safety, with a consensus that blame-free cultures and those that support 
and promote safety and reporting would be more successful. 
There was agreement by state agencies with some of these beliefs. The 
literature specific to state agency perceptions, however, is extremely scarce. The 
only study located demonstrated that state agencies are aware of under-reporting 
and believe it is caused by some of the same factors that institutions also report. 
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However, the methodology and results of the study were not described fully, so a 
complete analysis of this study is not possible. The interview protocol published in 
the report reveals that only two of the questions on the survey specifically asked 
about under-reporting: “Is there a high level of reporting compliance among hospitals 
or is there a problem with under reporting?” and, “What factors influence 
compliance?”  
Limitations in the Literature 
 Most of the literature that was captured in this search is limited in some 
manner. The seven editorials and commentaries are opinion only, at least as far as 
their references to external reporting barriers or strategies for success, although they 
may be based on research that has not been referenced in the articles. Similarly, the 
issues overviews did not present a methodology for searching the literature to reach 
their conclusions, but instead appeared to collect references that reflected the 
author’s purposes.  
These articles must be considered warily in terms of any contribution they 
make to the state of knowledge on the subject. They have been included here 
because they illustrate the degree to which some elements of the question of 
external error reporting may have reached a consensus that is not necessarily based 
on data. They may illustrate the phenomenon of strongly held beliefs not supported 
by evidence. Nevertheless, as Table 2-2 illustrates, there is a great deal of overlap in 
the issues and concerns raised in these less-substantial articles, as compared with 
the original studies and systematic literature reviews. 
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The original studies were of various validity. Weissman et al. interviewed 
hospital administrators. While leadership is vital to reporting compliance, 
administrators are not necessarily the hospital personnel who make decisions 
regarding external reporting. Hospital risk managers and compliance officers would 
have been appropriate to include in the sample.  
Marchev et al. do not quantify their conclusions. They state that “The 
following were among the reasons cited for under reporting,” (Marchev et al., 2003: 
20) but they do not report how many of the 19 states in the sample reported each or 
all of the five reasons they give. Likewise, Barach and Small reach their conclusions 
without discussing the specifics of the interview sample and precisely which 
industries the experts represented.  
Spigelman and Swan, and Hutchinson et al., studied error reporting barriers 
and facilitators, but in countries (Australia and the UK) where providers report 
directly into the national system. Their conclusions regarding data control concerns 
and cultures of safety may be transferrable to the USA, but mainly correspond to 
internal reporting processes in this country. 
In most of the original studies and literature reviews conclusions about 
barriers to external reporting were not the primary focus of the research. They 
appear incidentally or tangentially, and are not necessarily the product of the study 
designs. Although Weissman et al., Hutchinson et al., and Morton et al. report 
statistical data specifically regarding external reporting barriers, their data are highly 
specific to their chosen subject (such as a comparison of two specific databases, 
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rather than  a broader review of the success of several voluntary and mandatory 
databases), or not limited to surgical error reporting.  
Limitations in this Review 
Inclusion of studies not specifically referring to surgical error reporting is also 
a limitation of this literature search. Although the search terms were specific to 
surgical error, many of the articles that were retrieved were not limited to surgical 
errors, and frequently did not address them specifically. Instead, the literature 
tended to discuss reportable medical errors in general, particularly the studies of 
NYPORTS and in foreign countries, where it appears that many incident reports are 
entered into government databases that would not meet the more restricted criteria 
of surgical errors as defined by many state systems in the USA. 
Conclusion 
 The literature on barriers to external reporting of surgical errors is immature. 
Little work has been published specific to the processes hospitals and other medical 
institutions engage as they report, or fail to report, as required by many states. There 
remain questions about whether barriers to internal reporting within hospitals may be 
analogous to external reporting barriers, perhaps with analogous solutions. It also 
remains mysterious whether states and institutions are fully aware of the extent of 
under-reporting, consider this a serious problem, or know what to do about it.  
 It is clear that there is widespread anxiety regarding the consequences of 
reporting. Legal liability, confidentiality and public embarrassment are frequently 
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cited as major factors complicating compliance with reporting. The actual effect of 
these concerns on reporting has not been quantified. 
Although some states have adopted the Patient Safety Organizations 
permitted under the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, no research was 
located that studies whether states with PSOs are experiencing improved rates of 
error reporting, even though the PSO system provides increased protection from 
discovery and disclosure. 
 Likewise, no research was discovered that compares rates of error reporting 
between states with mandatory and voluntary reporting systems, or between states 
with punitive and nonpunitive approaches to reported errors. 
  
  
  
4
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Table 2-1: SYNTHESIS OF STUDIES AND SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEWS 
 
Authors and 
Year 
Nation Methodology Sample Negative Barriers  Positive Recommendations 
Weissman et 
al. (2005) 
USA Cross-sectional 
survey 
203 hospital 
senior 
administrators 
By % asserting:  
 
Mandatory, nonconfidential nature (68%, 
p=.83)  
 
Mandatory, confidential nature (64%, 
p=.83 
 
Nonmandatory nature (73%, p = .83) 
 
Legal liability (79%, p=.01) 
 
Unclear reporting criteria (23%, p not 
stated) 
 
Belief systems do not effect patient 
safety (no effect or negative effect 73%, 
p=.04) 
 
Confidentiality 
 
Clarify definitions 
 
Collaborate with hospitals 
 
Grant protected access to 
information 
 
Liaison with state hospital and 
medical associations 
Spigelman 
and Swan 
(2004) 
AUS Cross-sectional 
survey 
12 users 
(including 
multiple 
hospitals for 
each user) of 
national 
reporting 
system 
Limited reporting capabilities 
 
Lack of control over database 
 
Monitoring of clinical quality and patient 
safety strategies would create an 
incentive for under-reporting 
Comparison data readily available 
Marchev et 
al. (2003) 
USA Cross-sectional 
survey 
Responsible 
managers in 19 
states with 
mandatory 
reporting 
systems 
Lack of internal systems to identify errors 
 
Lack of clarity over reporting 
requirements 
 
Reporting burden 
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Perception of lack of usefulness 
 
Lack of state enforcement 
 
Fear of legal liability and public 
embarrassment  
 
Hutchinson 
et al. (2007) 
UK Retrospective 
analysis of 
reports 
Incidents 
reported from 
148 hospitals  
 Culture of safety and reporting in 
organization. Higher reporting rates 
were correlated with encouragement 
to report (regression coefficient 0.03, 
CI 0.01 – 0.06, p=.009), with staff 
having experience reporting errors 
(regression coefficient 0.04, CI -
0.001 – 0.05, p=.058) 
Flink et al. 
(2009) 
USA Retrospective 
comparison of 
JCAHO and 
NYPORTS data 
11,028 reports 
to NYPORTS 
and 2405 to 
JCAHO 
Spontaneous reporting (non-automatic) 
 
Turnover of hospital reporting staff 
Mandatory reporting 
 
Effective information tech systems 
 
Information must be meaningful and 
useful to reporters 
 
Protection from discovery 
 
Include stakeholders in design and 
implementation 
 
Clear reporting criteria 
 
Ongoing training and support 
 
Stakeholder advisory 
 
Feedback to reporters 
Morton et al. 
(2004) 
USA Retrospective 
comparison of 
reports to NIS 
and SAGES 
99,552 cases in 
NIS, 579 cases 
in SAGES 
Voluntary system may lead to 
underreporting 
 
  
  
5
0 
Tuttle et al. 
(2002) 
USA Retrospective 
comparison of 
NYPORTS 
reports and 
hospital records 
560 case 
reviews 
Lack of clarity in internal systems 
 
 
Barach and 
Small (2000) 
USA Cross-sectional 
survey 
Unspecified  Debriefing procedures included in 
reporting 
 
Non-punitive systems 
 
Protected data 
 
Voluntary reporting 
 
Balance accountability, 
transparency, and protection 
Russell et al. 
(2003) 
UK, but 
refers 
to USA 
Systematic 
Literature 
Review 
3300+ studies Publicly disclosed mortality may 
contribute to a reluctance to treat high-
risk patients 
 
Fassett 
(2006) 
USA Systematic 
Literature 
Review 
“All relevant 
publications” 
Fear of legal liability Protection from discovery 
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Table 2-2: FACTORS AFFECTING ERROR REPORTING BY NUMBER OF 
ARTICLES IN WHICH THEY APPEAR 
 
FACTOR Studies Systematic 
Literature 
Reviews 
Issue 
Overviews 
Editorials  
BARRIERS TO REPORTING     
     
Policy: Mandatory nature of system ●  ● ● 
Policy: Voluntary nature of system ●●●    
Policy: Fear of legal and civil liability ●● ● ●● ●●● 
Policy: Concern about public 
disclosure  
●●  ●●●●●●● ●● 
Policy: Fear of professional retribution   ●● ●● 
Policy: Lack of state enforcement or 
resources 
●  ●●  
System: Lack of clarity of reporting 
requirements 
●●●  ●● ● 
System: Lack of control over 
information 
●    
System: Lack of feedback and 
perceived usefulness 
●●  ●  
Internal: Culture of shame and blame   ●●● ● 
Internal: Lack of effective internal 
systems to identify errors  
●    
Internal: Reporting  burden  ●    
Internal: Turnover of hospital 
reporting personnel  
●    
     
FACILITATORS OF REPORTING     
     
Policy: Voluntary nature of system ●    
Policy: Mandatory nature of system ●  ● ●● 
Policy: Protection from discovery or 
negative consequences 
●● ● ●●● ●● 
Policy: Public Disclosure    ●  
Policy: Protection from professional 
retribution 
  ● ●● 
Policy: Confidentiality of reports ●  ●●● ● 
System: Clear reporting criteria ●●  ●  
System: System ease of use   ●●● ● 
System: Effective analysis and 
feedback loop 
●●●●●  ●●  
System: System includes safety tools 
and incentives 
  ●  
System: Stakeholder involvement in 
design and implementation 
●●●    
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System: Ongoing training and 
education 
●  ●  
Internal: Culture of safety ●  ●●● ● 
Internal: Institutional leadership 
supportive of reporting 
  ●  
 
  
Chapter 3: Study Model and Methodology 
 
Study Objectives 
 The position that the state agency occupies is critical in relation to the other 
actors in the medical error reporting system. The literature review demonstrated, 
however, that little is currently known about the perceptions held by state agencies 
regarding the risk of surgical error under-reporting. The importance of the research 
questions derive from the vital role of the state surgical error reporting systems in the 
prevention of future errors. The objective of this study is to illuminate the beliefs of 
state agencies regarding potential under-reporting, and the states’ perception of their 
role in managing compliance with surgical error reporting requirements.  
 The study answers these questions: 
1. What are the states’ perceptions of compliance with mandatory reporting of 
surgical errors? 
 
2. What are the perceptions of state agencies regarding barriers to reporting of  
surgical errors?  
 
3. If states believe under-reporting is occurring, what is their level of concern 
about it? 
 
4. If states believe under-reporting is occurring, what are they doing about it? 
 
5. What are the states doing with their reported error data to improve healthcare 
Quality? 
 
6. What feedback do states give to providers regarding reported errors? 
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7. How do state agencies perceive their role in enforcing reporting 
requirements? 
Method and Support 
 This research consisted of a case study of state attitudes toward compliance 
with requirements for surgical error reporting, and leads to recommendations for 
ways that state and federal agencies can modify policies to improve error reporting. 
A case study model is appropriate because so little is known at this time about the 
degree of awareness or priority held by state agencies regarding under-reporting. 
The study is largely descriptive, intended to discover and report the perceptions of 
state agency leaders. The concept of “case” may include either the entity being 
studied, or an issue “for which cases are selected to illustrate...” (Creswell, 
1998:.63). This study examined an issue (under-reporting of surgical errors) for 
which cases (key informants in state agencies) were selected. A diverse sample of 
state agencies was chosen in order to include the variety of state error system types 
in the study. Table 3-3 displays the sampling frame used to assess the degree of 
heterogeneity among state reporting systems and to ensure diversity in the sample 
for key informant interviews.  
 Because the research questions are open-ended inquiries of the “What, how, 
why” type, a qualitative approach to the study is appropriate. Qualitative research is 
a strategy that illuminates phenomena by approaching the inquiry in particular ways, 
and “…for certain research problems, qualitative methods, which originate from 
within the tradition of the social sciences, offer a superior or alternative approach” 
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(Young, 2005: 215). Creswell notes several key characteristics of qualitative inquiry. 
Those are particularly applicable to this study are: 
1. “Natural setting – Qualitative researchers tend to collect data in the field at the 
site where participants experience the issue or problem under study.” 
 
2. “Researcher as key instrument – Qualitative researchers collect data 
themselves through examining documents, observing behavior, or 
interviewing participants.” 
 
3. “Inductive data analysis – Qualitative researchers build their patterns, 
categories, and themes from the bottom up, by organizing the data into 
increasingly more abstract units of information.” 
 
4. “Participants’ meanings – In the entire qualitative research process, the 
researcher keeps a focus on learning the meaning that the participants hold 
about the problem or issue, not the meaning that the researchers bring to the 
research or writers express in the literature.” 
 
5. “Theoretical lens – Qualitative researchers often use lens to view their 
studies…” 
 
6. “Interpretive – Qualitative research is a form of interpretive inquiry…” 
 
7. “Holistic account – Qualitative researchers try to develop a complex picture of 
the problem or issue under study. This involves reporting multiple 
perspectives, identifying the many factors involved in a situation, and 
generally sketching the larger picture that emerges” (Creswell, 2009: 175 – 
176). 
 
 This study design is consistent with the selected characteristics of Creswell: it 
was designed the take place in the natural setting of the key informants, utilizing a 
sole researcher, and conducted to develop answers to the research questions using 
the meanings reported by the key informants themselves. The extremity and 
complexity of responses was respected and sought, in order to serve the interpretive 
process.  
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 This study is also compatible with characteristics of qualitative studies 
described by Rubin and Rubin, who find the qualitative method suitable for those 
seeking: 
 “Nuance and subtlety” 
 Tracing “…how present situations resulted from prior events” 
 A fresh view 
 Explanations for the unexpected 
 “Layers of discovery” that lead to “alternatives that are then explored in turn” 
(Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 47 - 48). 
 
 This study seeks new explanations for phenomena not previously examined, 
and answering the research questions required understanding and sensitivity to 
subtleties in the informants’ responses and the pursuit of new explanations. 
 The samples in a qualitative study “…tend to be purposive, rather than 
random,” and small (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 27). In this study, the universe of 
state agencies available is 25, and the number of states selected for interviews was 
11. The sample was chosen deliberately, based on the high value that was placed 
on diversity of agency characteristics regarding error reporting. 
Environmental Model and Conceptual Framework 
 State error reporting systems operate within a complex landscape of 
government, health care institutions, health care providers, law, media and the 
public. The state agencies may interact with any or all of these stakeholders. The 
state agencies are subject to competing forces from the governmental side as well 
as from legal, institutional and public sectors. This study focused on questions 
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surrounding the ways that states regard the reporting hospitals as compliant or non-
compliant with reporting requirements. 
 The environmental model of the position of the state agency presented in 
Figure 3-1 was developed by the author to define the arena for the research 
questions. Because the environment is complex and includes many two-way 
influences, the conceptual model is a web of relationships and information pathways. 
It is at the point between the reporting health care institution and the state agency 
that the error reporting cycle of notifications, data analysis and feedback occurs 
under ideal circumstances.   
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FIGURE 3-1: LOCATION OF THE STUDY FOCUS WITHIN THE ENVIRONMENT 
OF ERROR REPORTING 
Error reporting and influence may theoretically occur between almost any two or 
more of these stakeholders, and in any direction. The primary concern of this study 
is reflected in the direction of the error reports and influence described in this model 
Key:  
Error Information Flow* (                )   
Legal, political and social influence (                )  
Both   (                )  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The conceptual framework for this study is derived from the central 
relationship between the reporting health care institution and the state agency in the 
model. The literature review discovered factors (both negative and positive) affecting 
error reporting compliance from the perspective of health care institutions.  The 
conceptual framework adopted for this study in Figure 3-2 is conceived as a tug-of-
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Media Public  
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State 
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war between factors that encourage and discourage compliance at the level of the 
reporting facility, and factors that encourage and discourage enforcement at the 
level of the state agency. 
 
FIGURE 3-2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
 
 
  
Factors discouraging 
reporting: 
 Fear of 
embarrassment 
 Fear of retribution 
 Fear of liability 
 Unawareness of 
requirements 
 Lack of resources 
for compliance 
 Lack of strong 
internal reporting 
systems 
Factors discouraging 
enforcement: 
 Budget limitations 
 Staffing shortages 
 Lack of 
understanding of 
the requirements 
 Lack of motivation 
to pursue the 
issue 
Reporting Hospital Qualified State 
Agency Outcome:  
Reporting 
Compliance 
Factors supporting reporting: 
 Enforcement 
 Value-added through 
feedback 
 Culture of 
accountability 
 Ease of reporting 
 No-blame culture 
 Quality orientation 
Factors supporting 
enforcement: 
 Executive 
oversight 
 Agency 
commitment 
 Personal concern 
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 The study methodology was crafted in part to respond to this conceptual 
framework by examining the understanding of the QSAs regarding these factors and 
the QSAs’ efforts to ensure reporting compliance. 
Overview of Study Design 
 This qualitative case study was conducted in two phases: a descriptive pre-
survey and a smaller selection of key informants for qualitative interviews. In order to 
answer the research questions, it was essential to begin by collecting state agency 
information through a pre-survey that permitted the key informant statements to be 
placed in context. The interviews with key informants in turn provided most of the 
data that answered the research questions.  
Pre-Survey 
 The purpose of the pre-interview survey was to differentiate between state 
agencies on the basis of bureaucratic and legal responses to surgical error reports. 
This differentiation allowed a diversification of the survey sample in order to ensure 
that perspectives from states with a variety of policies were included.  
 The survey also provided updated information on the practices of the 
agencies. National Academy of State Health Policy reports from 2002 to 2007 report 
a rapidly evolving environment in which the number of states requiring error 
reporting has accelerated, the levels of protections extended to reporters have 
evolved, and the definitions of reportable errors have begun to standardize across 
the country. 
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Key Informant Interviews 
 Following the collection of the pre-interview survey results and the selection 
of the key informant sample, key informant interviews were conducted. Key 
informant interviews followed accepted practice regarding recruitment, 
confidentiality, interview conduct and documentation, and protection of data. The 
data received from the key informant interviews were coded and analyzed in context 
with the information received from the pre-interview surveys.  
Analysis and Plan for Change 
 The research questions were answered using the information from both data 
sources, and discussed in the context of relevant organizational theory. A plan for 
change is proposed using the results of the research as support for public policies 
that will encourage greater awareness of the need to ensure that all reportable 
surgical errors are in fact reported, and that reports lead to improvements in patient 
safety.  
 The study components were structured and sequenced as described in 
Figure 3-3: 
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FIGURE 3-3: STUDY COMPONENTS AND SEQUENCE 
 
 
Study Design and Research Strategy in Detail 
Study Subjects 
 The study was multi-sited, focused upon an issue of interest. The human 
subjects of this study were Qualified State Managers (QSMs) located within the 
Qualified State Agencies (QSAs) that receive reports of surgical errors. QSAs are 
typically units or divisions within the state health department or its equivalent. In 
some states QSAs have multiple responsibilities including licensing of health care 
entities and error reporting, while other states have separated the two functions into 
distinct units. In states with such separation, the QSA was the unit that manages 
error reporting. The QSMs had responsibility for receiving or managing, or 
supervising the receiving or managing, of incoming medical error reports.  
 The selection of study subjects and the key informant sample in this research 
followed a funneling strategy as described in Figure 3-1: 
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Interview  
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FIGURE 3-4: SELECTION OF STUDY SUBJECTS 
 
 
Inclusion 
 Subjects were included in the pre-interview sample selection and key 
informant sample selection if they were QSMs.  
Exclusion 
 No exclusions were necessary from the QSM sample selection. 
 
All states and 
federal territories 
and districts  
 
States, territories 
and districts that 
require surgical 
error reporting 
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Study Setting 
 The research was conducted by telephone at the subjects’ workplaces. 
Additional information was exchanged by email. Published reports of state medical 
error programs and the laws that established them also provided necessary data. 
Definitions 
 Several challenging terms required careful definition in this study. Among the 
most critical are “reportable error” and “surgical error.” Additionally, this study 
considered “punitive” and “non-punitive” responses to error reporting. These and 
other terms required clear definition. 
Qualified State Agency: An organization was considered “qualified” for sample selection 
for this study if it met al.l of the following criteria: 
 
1. It is located within the executive branch of a state, territorial or federal district 
government 
2. The state, territory or federal district in which it is located requires surgical errors to 
be reported to the state by health care entities 
3. It is designated as the entity within the state, territory or federal district government 
that receives reports of surgical errors from medical facilities 
 
Qualified State Manager: A manager was qualified for participation in this study if he/she 
met al.l of the following criteria: 
 
1. He/she works within a Qualified State Agency 
2. He/she is responsible for managing the receipt of reports of surgical errors from 
medical facilities OR 
3. He/she is responsible for supervising those who manage the receipt of reports of 
surgical errors from medical facilities 
Reportable Medical Error: “Reportable Medical Errors” were defined in this study as any 
medical error that is required to be reported to the state. If a state required an error to be 
reported, it was considered a “Reportable Medical Error.” This simple term was be used 
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consistently in survey and interview stages and was defined for the survey and interview 
participants. 
Reportable Surgical Error: “Reportable Surgical Errors” were defined in this study as any 
surgical error that is required to be reported to the state. The commonality of the NQF 
definitions used by many states is a strength of error reporting systems, but it was also 
valuable to examine the experiences and insights of states that define their own surgical 
errors. It is the nature of reporting, under-reporting and enforcement that concerned this 
study, so the insights of states that developed their own definitions of surgical errors were as 
useful as those that follow the NQF definitions. 
Punitive: States were considered to take a “Punitive” approach to reported surgical errors 
when they may take any of these actions in response to errors reported in compliance with 
state law:  
1. Open an investigation into the incident 
2. Expose the reporting facility to the potential of a Statement of Deficiencies 
3. Expose the reporting facility to the potential of a required Plan of Correction 
4. Expose the reporting facility to the potential of fines 
5. Expose the reporting facility to the potential of suspension or loss of license 
 
“Punitive” did not include requiring facilities to submit documentation related directly to the 
event, including reports, case records, root cause analyses (including associated plans for 
correction), or any other quality improvement record as a normal part of the process of 
receiving the error report. Submission of these types of documents was considered routine. 
“Punitive” also did not include release of aggregated, facility-specific or incident-specific data 
to the public when this was a normal part of the state practice in response to reported errors. 
Such data release was also considered routine, unless the power to release such data was 
used selectively in response to some reported errors and not others. 
  
Nonpunitive: States were considered to take a non-punitive approach to reported surgical 
errors when they did not take any of the “Punitive” actions defined above.  
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Recruitment 
 Study participants were selected from the twenty-five “Qualified State 
Agencies” in the USA. Within each QSA the most appropriate QSM was identified 
through email and telephone inquiries, considering the advice of the NASHP and the 
NQF, which have frequent contact with many QSAs. When the most appropriate 
QSM was identified, a series of timed contacts was employed to encourage 
participation for each of the two projects (pre-interview survey and key informant 
interviews): 
1. Email to QSMs thanking them for agreeing to participate and describing the 
coming pre-interview telephone survey and its purposes and confidentiality 
provisions (standard form attached as Appendix A) 
 
2. QSMs were contacted by telephone or email to confirm a mutually-acceptable 
time for completion of the pre-interview survey 
 
3. After the sample selection was completed for key informant interviews, the 
selected subjects were contacted again by email and a mutually-acceptable 
time was decided for completion of the interview 
 
4. When key informants were not present or available at the scheduled interview 
time, an additional contact by telephone or email was made to reschedule 
and to express the value of the subject’s participation in the study 
 
Pre-Interview Survey  
 QSMs in the twenty-five states that actively require reporting of medical errors 
were contacted and requested to complete a short telephone pre-interview survey. 
The pre-interview survey is attached as Appendix B. The survey consisted of fifteen 
questions, two of which give permission for further contact.  
 
 67 
 
 Two key areas of the pre-survey asked the QSMs’ opinions regarding 
compliance by health care entities with reporting requirements, and awareness of 
unreported errors discovered through other channels. Critical additional information 
in the pre-interview survey included types of facilities that were required to report 
surgical errors, definitions of surgical errors used in the state, and potential 
consequences under state policy to providers who comply with reporting 
requirements. This last component was used to ensure that the key informants 
include states with both punitive and non-punitive approaches to reported errors. 
 In addition, legal protections for reporters and details of state data analysis 
and data release were collected in order to generate a current context for the 
interviews. 
 Content validity of the pre-interview survey was established through a pretest 
of the survey instrument by four employees and two managers performing regulatory 
compliance in a state agency outside the QSA selection, following which the 
instrument was revised and refined. Survey categories were rewritten for clarity and 
restructured for logical flow. 
 Because responses to the pre-survey were used to diversify the key informant 
sample, it was valuable that many of the questions in the pre-survey updated 
information that was not published since 2007. These items are identified below by 
(*). Questions that reveal information not currently available from any other identified 
source are identified below by (**): 
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 What facilities must report errors in the state (*) 
 What are the potential regulatory consequences of error reporting (*) 
 What types of disclosure of reports are made to the public and press (*) 
 What legal protections may result from reporting by facilities to the state (*) 
 What definitions are used in requiring error reporting (*) 
 What does the state estimate as the level of compliance with error reporting 
(**) 
 What is done with reported error information? (*) 
 What role does the agency receiving reports have in enforcement of reporting 
requirements (**) 
 
 The survey questions were written with attention to ease of reading and 
comprehension and clarity of response options. Because QSMs were anticipated to 
be college graduates, questions were written to approximately a 12th grade reading 
level.  
Selection of Key Informants for Interviews 
 The results of the pre-interview survey were used in the selection of key 
informants for interviews. The selection was guided by the principle of diversification 
of the sample, which is important in order to ensure that a variety of perspectives 
and opinions are included in the data. Although the universe of QSAs is not large, 
efforts were made to include QSMs from states that fall into each of the categories 
described in Table 3-3: Low and High Perceived Under-Reporting; Low and High 
Punitive Response to Error Reports; and Low and High Role in Enforcement of 
Reporting Requirements. The intention of this study was to perform key informant 
interviews with 35% - 45% of QSMs, for a total of between 9 and 11 interviews, and 
with sufficient sample size to include at least one QSM in each of the categories in 
Table 3-3:  
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TABLE 3-1: SAMPLING FRAME FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
SAMPLE TO INCLUDE QUALIFIED STATE AGENCIES WITH: 
 
Dimension I: Perceived Under-Reporting 
 
LOW HIGH 
Dimension II: Punitive Response to 
Reported Errors 
 
LOW 
HIGH 
 
Dimension III: Role in Enforcement of 
Reporting Requirements 
LOW HIGH 
  
 A score for each QSA on each dimension was calculated from the pre-survey 
responses or from recoding of some variables on the pre-survey. Each QSA was 
placed in either the “LOW” or “HIGH” category for each dimension.  
Key Informant Interviews 
 The major component of the study consisted of semi-structured, open-ended 
key informant interviews with QSMs. The interviews were conducted by telephone 
as in-person interviews were impractical due to the nationwide scope of the sample. 
The interviews followed a constructed interview protocol to ensure that identical 
topics were raised in each interview.  The interview guide is attached as Appendix C. 
Each interview concentrated on questions surrounding under-reporting: the QSMs’ 
perceptions of their state agency’s role in enforcement, the possible causes of 
under-reporting, uses of reported data and whether the key informants believe that 
improving under-reporting is an issue worth investing in and is supported by their 
state agency, executive or legislative body. 
 The interview guide progressed through major topic areas that reflect the 
primary research questions. Each topic area included several questions designed to 
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illuminate the general topic. The topic areas correspond to the research questions in 
this way:  
TABLE 3-2: INTERVIEW TOPICS KEYED TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Interview Topic Area Research Questions Addressed 
Extent of concern regarding 
possible noncompliance 
What are the states’ perceptions of compliance with 
mandatory reporting of surgical errors? 
 
Perceptions of potential 
causes of underreporting 
 
What are the perceptions of state agencies 
regarding barriers to reporting of surgical errors?  
 
Perceptions of the 
Agency’s role in 
enforcement 
 
If states believe under-reporting is occurring, what 
is their level of concern about it? 
 
If states believe under-reporting is occurring, what 
are they doing about it? 
 
How do state agencies perceive their role regarding 
enforcement of reporting requirements 
 
Perceptions of the 
Agency’s role in analysis of 
error reporting data 
 
Are the state agencies using their reported error 
data to improve healthcare quality?  
 
What feedback do state agencies give to providers 
regarding reported errors? 
 
 Interviews were digitally recorded with the key informants’ permission, and 
were transcribed and analyzed as described below. 
Reliability and Validity 
 Both the pre-interview survey guide and the key informant interview guide 
were subjected to processes intended to ensure reliability and validity.  
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 Reliability: Pre-interview survey coding and key informant interview 
transcripts were double-checked for errors. Code drift was controlled through careful 
memo writing regarding the meaning of the codes, and through continual checking of 
data against codes. This is consistent with the guidance of Creswell, who notes 
“Make sure that there is not a drift in the definition of codes, a shift in the meaning of 
the codes during the process of coding. This can be accomplished by constantly 
comparing data with the codes and by writing memos about the codes and their 
definitions” (Creswell, 2009: 190). 
 Validity: Content validity of the pre-interview survey and key informant 
interview guide was achieved through field-testing by employees and managers 
performing regulatory compliance in a state agency outside sample selection. 
Feedback was solicited for clarity, ease of use, relevance and other factors that may 
have influenced results. The survey instrument and interview guide were modified in 
response to this feedback.  
 Both the pre-interview survey and key informant interviews were subjected to 
peer debriefing, in which a person not involved in the study reviewed the data. This 
process adds an “interpretation beyond the researcher and invested in another 
person” and “adds validity to an account” (Creswell, 2009: 192). The two peer 
debriefers both responded that the conclusions appeared reasonable and logically 
followed from the findings. 
 The process of member checking was employed to clarify or verify the 
themes arising from the data. Member checking was conducted through follow-up 
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emails. Two key informants were asked to review the study findings and conclusions 
for validity. One key informant disagreed with one conclusion. The conclusion was 
reviewed in light of the key informant’s comments and was modified to clarify that 
effective use of data does not necessarily require complete reporting, and deletion of 
a statement that enforcement must be used to be of value. 
 Finally, triangulation resulting from multiple viewpoints contributed to study 
validity. “If themes are established based on converging several sources of data or 
perspectives from participants, then this process can be claimed as adding to the 
validity of the study” (Creswell, 2009: 191). Triangulation was achieved through 
multiple interviews with a state agency, and through comparison of interview data 
with published laws and state agency reports. 
Risks and Benefits: IRB and Confidentiality 
 It was anticipated that only a rare risk of harm to the study subjects existed. A 
request for an exemption from full review was granted by the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB). The minimal risk to the subjects was based on possible lapses in 
confidentiality of the data resulting from key informant interviews. Rigorous 
segregation and protection of interview subject identifying information was employed 
to protect against this risk. Final analysis and publication of the interview data does 
not include personal or state identifiers.  
 The pre-interview survey was not handled in the same confidential manner 
because the information sought through the survey was mostly publicly available 
and reveals policy, rather than opinion. In those areas where the pre-survey includes 
 73 
 
potentially embarrassing information, such as opinions regarding error reporting 
compliance, the same dual protections of personal and state identifiers were 
employed. 
 Verbal consent for the pre-interview survey included an explanation that 
completing the survey constituted consent to participate in only that portion of the 
study. Consent for participation in the key informant interviews was obtained verbally 
before the interviews commenced and confidentiality provisions were reviewed at 
that time. 
 The benefits of the study outweigh the minimal risk to participants. The study 
yielded descriptive data regarding state agencies that are novel or have not been 
updated since 2007. More importantly, the qualitative component illuminates the 
perceptions of state agencies regarding potential under-reporting of surgical errors 
and their role in the enforcement of error reporting requirements. This in turn may 
lead to increases in patient safety through awareness of the importance of the 
success of the error reporting process.  
Study Delimitations  
 This study was bounded in several ways. It was limited to only those states 
where surgical errors are reported to a state agency by law or regulation. As of 
2012, this included 26 agencies (25 states and the District of Columbia). One state 
(Oregon) has a system of voluntary error reporting, and was not included for that 
reason.  A total of 25 states and federal districts were included in the study universe. 
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The remaining states and territories had no requirements for surgical error reporting 
and were not included in the study. 
 As described in Figure 3-1, the environment in which surgical errors occur 
and are reported and analyzed is complex. The role of the state agency touches 
many other institutions and stakeholders. Because the research questions focus on 
the state agencies’ perceptions of error reporting compliance, the study was 
bounded by examining only the perceptions of the state agencies, rather than the 
perceptions of the other actors in the error reporting system. Although many 
important players, including legislators, executive branch officials, hospital 
administrators and the public are excluded from the study in this manner, the 
requirement for reporting emanates from the state executive branches, and thus the 
examination of the designated state agencies’ opinions was of most importance in 
answering the study questions. 
Study Limitations 
Several limitations of this study must be acknowledged: 
 
1. The key informants may not have been the most knowledgeable or effective 
personnel within the state agencies on the subject of the agencies’ 
perceptions of the potential for under-reporting and the agencies’ role in 
enforcing reporting. The selection of key informants included inquiries into the 
position, role and responsibilities of the individuals, but it is possible that 
others within the same or adjacent agencies may have had greater 
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knowledge of the states’ positions on the subject. It is possible that several 
individuals had responsibilities for different aspects of the reporting cycle, and 
may have had different perspectives that may not all have been captured. 
 
2. The key informants may have been reluctant to portray their states or their 
agencies in a perceived negative light. They may have been inclined to 
minimize the potential for under-reporting of surgical errors in their states, and 
to over-emphasize the effectiveness of their states in ensuring compliance 
with the laws and regulations. They may also have been inclined to minimize 
any perceived deficiencies in the quality activities of their agencies after data 
had been submitted.  
 
3. The key informants, even if the most qualified subjects for the study, may not 
have been completely aware of their respective agencies’ policies and 
institutional approaches to the topic of under-reporting of surgical errors. The 
key informants may, in such cases, have provided information they believed 
will please the interviewer rather than truthfully stating that they did not have 
information. 
 
Researcher Bias 
 
 Creswell notes that the researcher in a qualitative study is engaged in 
interpretive research, which presents a range of ethical issues. The researcher 
should, therefore, “…explicitly identify reflexively their biases, values, and personal 
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background…that may shape their interpretations formed during a study” (Creswell, 
2009: 177).  
 I have worked in the field of hospital licensing in the state of Washington for 
thirteen years. At times I have been responsible for enforcing the state law that 
hospitals report certain medical errors to the Department in which I work. I have also 
reviewed the reports hospitals have made, their investigations of their errors, and 
their plans for improvement to prevent future errors.  
 In the course of my work I became aware that at least some reportable errors 
were not reported as required in my state, and I cited several hospitals for failing to 
do so. My perception is that there is no reason to assume that Washington is 
different in this respect than any other state where error reports are required.  
 I must acknowledge my perception that under-reporting is a real 
phenomenon, and that it is unlikely to be corrected without active intervention by 
state agencies. However, upon beginning this study I had limited understanding of 
the nature of the work performed in other states where error reporting is mandatory. 
I had no knowledge of the techniques that other states have tried to improve 
reporting compliance, or whether their strategies to implement their laws and rules 
were more effective than I have observed in Washington. In this study it was 
necessary to maintain a position of openness to the unique characteristics and 
experiences of each state in the sample, and to particularly note the perceptions and 
experiences of those states that challenged my experience in Washington. 
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Limitation Management: 
1. Initial recruitment of the Qualified Managers included the advice of 
researchers at the National Academy for State Health Policy, which produced 
numerous reports on the subject of state agencies and reportable medical 
errors over more than a decade. NASHP has accumulated the largest 
available published data collection regarding the characteristics of the 
Qualified State Agencies, so the advice of NASHP regarding key contacts 
within these agencies was valuable. The guidance of the National Quality 
forum was also sought regarding identification of QSMs and was extremely 
helpful when combined with that of the NASHP. 
 
2. The pre-survey and interview included assurances of confidentiality and 
encouragements to respond frankly. Respondents were informed that they 
were making a contribution to research seeking answers that will make 
reporting systems more effective. They were encouraged to conduct the 
interview in private, so that they might speak freely. This was intended to 
encourage veracity and completeness of responses, and to overcome 
possible temptation on the part of respondents to portray their agencies in 
what the respondent may believe to be the best light. 
 
3. Researcher bias was mitigated by crafting a survey instrument and interview 
guide that reflected objectivity and openness to the unique experiences and 
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perspectives of the various states. Particular attention was paid when state 
responses contradicted or challenged my own experiences and expectations. 
 
4. Emphasis was placed on recognizing and considering discrepant information. 
Contradictory evidence widens and validates the account of a theme in the 
data (Creswell, 2009). 
 
  
 
Chapter 4: Pre-Survey Results  
 
The pre-survey and key informant interviews followed the guides in 
Appendices B and C. These instruments were designed so that topic areas 
corresponded to the research questions as described in Table 4-1. Each topic area 
was developed and analyzed to reveal descriptive and qualitative data that lead to 
answers to the research questions. The topics, corresponding research questions 
and data sources were: 
 
TABLE 4-1: STUDY TOPICS KEYED TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DATA 
SOURCES 
 
Study Topic  Research Questions  Data Source 
1. Extent of concern 
regarding 
possible 
noncompliance 
What are the states’ perceptions of 
compliance with mandatory reporting of 
surgical errors? 
 
Pre-survey 
2. Perceptions of 
potential causes 
of underreporting 
 
What are the perceptions of state 
agencies regarding barriers to reporting 
of surgical errors?  
 
Key 
Informant 
Interview 
3. Perceptions of the 
Agency’s role in 
enforcement 
 
If states believe under-reporting is 
occurring, what is their level of concern 
about it? 
 
If states believe under-reporting is 
occurring, what are they doing about it? 
 
 
 
How do state agencies perceive their 
role regarding enforcement of reporting 
Key 
Informant 
Interview 
 
 
Pre-survey 
and  
Key 
Informant 
Interview 
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requirements? 
 
Key 
Informant 
Interview 
 
 
4. Perceptions of the 
Agency’s role in 
analysis of error 
reporting data 
 
Are the state agencies using their 
reported error data to improve healthcare 
quality?  
 
What feedback do state agencies give to 
providers regarding reported errors? 
Key 
Informant 
Interview 
 
 
Pre-survey 
and  
Key 
Informant 
Interview 
 
 
 For each topic area, the data resulted in key findings that are presented here, 
followed by the data that supported the findings. Topic 1 is addressed in the pre-
survey results presented in this chapter. Chapter 5 includes results of Topics 2 – 4.  
 Twenty-seven Qualified State Agencies (QSAs) were contacted by email and 
telephone during September – December, 2012. During the course of these contacts 
it was found that one state (Wyoming) had ceased its medical error reporting 
program. Another state (Illinois) had never implemented its program due to lack of 
funding. The universe of QSAs was reduced to 25. 
 Telephone pre-surveys were conducted with 22 of 25 QSAs (88.0%). QSM 
responses were documented on the pre-survey instrument. Verbatim notes were 
taken by hand for the open-ended questions. All identified QSMs in the 22 contacted 
states agreed to be interviewed by telephone or provided substantially complete 
information by email. The refusal rate for the 22 states was 0.0%  
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 Three QSAs could not be contacted for interviews. However, two of these 
three QSAs publish annual reports of their medical error reporting programs that 
provided significant data. Thus, the pre-survey was substantially completed for 24 of 
25 QSAs (96.0%). One QSA (South Carolina) could not be contacted by telephone 
or email, and no published medical error report could be found. 
 Complete results of the pre-survey are found in Appendix D. Descriptive data 
are presented here, followed by transitional qualitative data included in the pre-
survey. The descriptive data illustrate the variety of program approaches to surgical 
error reporting. Note that the n varies between data presentations because not all 
states responded to every question on the pre-survey. 
Topic 1: Extent of concern regarding possible noncompliance 
Pre-Survey Descriptive Data: 
KEY FINDING #1: There is great consistency between the states in terms of the 
types of health care entities that must report surgical errors and the response 
of the QSA to a report. (Reference Figures 4-1 and 4-2) 
 States with error reporting programs universally require hospitals to report 
surgical errors to the QSA. Most also require ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs) to 
report surgical errors, although in several states the specific categories of errors that 
must be reported differed between hospitals and ASCs. Requiring error reports from 
dental surgery centers and physician office-based surgery was unusual. 
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 Most QSAs required the reporting health care entity to complete an internal 
investigation in the form of a root cause analysis (RCA), and submit the RCA to the 
QSA. As part of the RCA, most states also required the reporting entity to generate a 
plan of correction and submit this as well. Some QSAs reported that the state might 
also conduct its own investigation of a reported event, and that investigation could 
result in a statement of deficiencies issued to the entity. Highly punitive actions such 
as fines, action against the entity’s license or action against a practitioner were not 
common features of the programs. 
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FIGURE 4-1: FACILITIES REQUIRED TO REPORT 
SURGICAL ERRORS BY NUMBER OF STATES WITH THIS 
REQUIREMENT 
n=25  (State agencies may have multiple responses to this question) 
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KEY FINDING #2: There is great variety between the states in the definitions of 
surgical errors, disclosure practices, legal protections offered to reporting 
entities, enforcement strategies and internal use of the data by the QSAs. 
(Reference Figures 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6 and 4-7) 
 Error reports received by QSAs were released to the public by a majority of 
the QSAs, but the amount of detail available to the public varied. Some states 
reported only aggregate data (e.g., “x number of events were reported in the state 
this year”) while others revealed the number of events by type, by date, and by 
naming the health care entity where the error occurred. A few did not disclose any 
reported surgical error data to the public. 
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FIGURE 4-2: RESPONSES OF STATES TO REPORTS OF 
SURGICAL ERRORS 
n=25 (State agencies may have multiple responses to this question) 
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 Most states assured the reporting health care entities that the data submitted 
were protected from legal discovery. A few stated that entities were offered 
protection from liability for the data submitted, while others provided no legal 
guarantees to the entities that report.
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FIGURE 4-3: DISCLOSURE OF REPORTED ERRORS BY 
STATE AGENCIES 
n=23 (State agencies may have multiple responses to this question) 
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FIGURE 4-4: PROTECTION OFFERED BY STATES TO 
REPORTING HEALTH CARE ENTITIES 
n=21 (State agencies may have multiple responses to this question) 
 85 
 
 Nearly half of the states that require medical errors to be reported have 
chosen the definitions of reportable surgical error published by the National Quality 
Forum (NQF). Among those states that did not adopt the NQF definitions in full, 
many had definitions that mirrored one or more of the five NQF categories. Several 
states, however, used a broad requirement to report death or disability caused by 
abuse or neglect, or death or disability resulting from surgery, rather than specific 
surgical errors. 
 
 
  
 Use of reported surgical error data by QSAs varied widely. Some QSAs used 
reported data to discovery year-over-year trends in error reports, and to analyze 
events by type of error. As part of the analysis many states also disseminated 
information to the health care industry, providing a feedback loop to the entities that 
reported the errors to the QSA. Other states, however, used the data only in 
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FIGURE 4-5: DEFINITION OF SURGICAL ERROR USED BY 
STATES 
n=25 (State agencies may have multiple responses to this question) 
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aggregate form (tracking total numbers of events reported) while some did nothing at 
all with the data that was submitted. 
 
  
 It was common for QSAs to engage in enforcement of the reporting 
requirements. Penalties for failure to report a surgical error were common, with fines 
being the most frequently mentioned sanction. Few states took no punitive action 
when a health care entity failed to report a surgical error as required. 
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FIGURE 4-6: ANALYSIS OF REPORTED SURGICAL 
ERRORS BY STATES 
n=24 (State agencies may have multiple responses to this question) 
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 These descriptive results have two applications in this study: they are vital for 
diversification of the key informant interview sample (ensuring that minority 
viewpoints on this key question are represented) and they establish the context for 
the additional data generated from the key informant interviews. 
 Before presenting the results of the key informant interviews in the next 
chapter, however, there is was a set of qualitative data included in the pre-survey 
that is critical for the understanding of the perceptions of the states regarding under-
reporting of surgical errors. 
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FIGURE 4-7: ENFORCEMENT OF ERROR REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS BY STATES 
n=24 (State agencies may have multiple responses to this question) 
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Pre-Survey Qualitative Data: 
 The telephone pre-survey contained several open-ended questions that 
provided both descriptive and qualitative data.  Qualified State Managers (QSMs) 
were asked three questions:  
1. Have you ever become aware of surgical errors that should have been 
reported to your agency, but were not? 
 
2. If so, how did you become aware of these unreported errors? 
 
3. Of the surgical errors that occur in your state, and are required to be reported 
to your agency, what % do you think are actually reported? 
 
  
KEY FINDING #3: About half of the states discover unreported surgical errors. 
The discoveries are made through patient and family complaints, media 
reports, and medical audits. (Reference Figures 4-8 and 4-9)  
 Over half of responding QSMs stated that their agency had become aware of 
unreported surgical errors. The route by which the QSA became aware of these 
errors varied widely, with discovery in the course of a routine licensing survey or a 
complaint from a patient or family member being the most common ways that a QSA 
became aware of these events. 
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One QSM stated that:  
Sometimes we do find out through other means. For example, the media. 
There can be a news story about a patient who went to the hospital and found 
out that she had a retained foreign object. Also our office has a collection of 
certain data on retained foreign objects that facilities have to enter in. Once a 
year we go through the data of coding for retained foreign objects and then 
we compare to our database. Pretty much once a year we find something that 
should have been reported but wasn’t. 
 
 Another QSM considered failure to report to be a serious violation of the 
rules:  
 When the hospital team doing complaints and incident reports are out, they 
 have been citing for failure to report. Failure to report is bigger than reported 
 late. 
 
KEY FINDING #4: A large majority of QSMs believe that there is no way of 
determining whether all surgical errors are being reported as required. 
(Reference Figure 4-10) 
 The research questions in this study relate to state perceptions of under-
reporting, both in terms of risk and reality, and the state’s responses to these 
perceptions. The question “Of the surgical errors that occur in your state, and are 
required to be reported to your agency, what % do you think are actually reported?” 
is the key question that leads to development and contextualization of the qualitative 
results for this study. 
 Of those QSMs that responded to this question, a large majority responded 
that they have no way of knowing how many events that should be reported to them 
actually are reported. A far fewer number of QSMs expressed confidence that their 
agency receives most or all of the events that must be reported.  
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Themes arising from QSM responses to this question included: 
 The true number of reportable events is unknown 
 Legal risk inhibits reporting 
 The reporting systems are vulnerable to health care entity choice to report 
 Lack of resources inhibits knowledge of the true number of events 
 States have confidence that a good relationship with entities ensures 
reporting 
 Under-reporting is suspected or established by data 
  
 When asked to estimate the percentage of reportable errors that were 
actually reported, most declined to guess, and instead responded that the question 
was impossible to answer. The uncertainty was frequently accompanied by a 
suspicion that under-reporting was a risk: 
That is really a tough question because I feel I don’t know how many aren’t 
reported. I couldn’t answer that. To be honest I don’t believe probably a very 
significant number. 
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I wouldn’t honestly be able to put a number to that. All of us here in the office 
would agree there’s under-reporting. To the degree and level we don’t know. 
 
 One reason for the uncertainty was that the QSA did not have the resources 
to pursue the question: 
We don’t go out to do site visits, so we’re not out there going through medical 
records. The OIG has published a recent report about adverse event 
reporting and their statistics were appalling and alarming. The number of 
errors that they found that hadn’t been reported internally, and then of course 
only a certain number of states require external reporting. It’s sad, the 
number. I wouldn’t be able to even hazard a guess, but I think we’re probably 
on line with what the OIG reported. 
 Another QSM noted that awareness of the reporting requirements could be an 
obstacle to compliance: 
All you can do it do everything you can to educate people about what is 
required to be reported. I don’t have any sense about how complete it is. 
Every year we learn of situations where someone wasn’t aware of what was 
required under the law. 
 
 Some QSMs expressed confidence that their systems captured most or all 
reportable surgical errors. Still, they acknowledged some uncertainty about how the 
truth could be known: 
We’ve tried to trust. Of the ones that are known, I would say the majority are 
reported. 
 
I would say it’s pretty good since there’s no…nothing has really come of it 
since they had to start reporting in ’06. There haven’t been any specific 
investigations because of the data they’ve reported. 
 
I’m not aware of anything that we didn’t find out about. The built in catch is 
that it is that it’s protected. It behooves them to report to us. 
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QSMs that believe their state receives a low percentage of required reports 
also couched their opinions in uncertainty: 
I could imagine that we’re getting a low number. I can’t tell you why, but I can 
imagine that is what happens. 
 
 Because this is the key question for contextualization of the qualitative data, a 
representative sample of the various responses is presented in Appendix E. 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 5: Key Informant Interview Results  
 
 
Key informants were selected from the respondents to the telephone pre-
survey. Data from the pre-survey were used to diversify the key informant sample 
according to the sampling frame presented in Chapter 3. Selected key informants 
were contacted by email, and telephone interviews were conducted November 2012 
– January 2013.  
Twelve key informants from ten states completed a telephone interview. In 
the eleventh state the QSM declined an interview but provided detailed email 
responses to the interview questions. Published reports from three states provided 
triangulation that confirmed the accounts of the key informants and contributed 
additional evidence relevant to the topic areas. The refusal rate for the 11 QSMs 
was 0.0% 
Key informant interviews were recorded for accuracy and transcribed by a 
professional medical transcriptionist. Transcripts were validated and corrected by 
comparison with the recordings. Transcripts were imported into MaxQDA v10 
software for management of the qualitative data set. One key informant participated 
in a telephone interview but declined to be recorded. His/her responses to key 
questions were recorded verbatim by hand during the interview. A second key 
informant declined a telephone interview but responded by email to the interview 
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questions. Transcriptions of these two key informant contacts were also entered into 
the software, along with published annual reports of error reporting programs in 
three states. 
Key informants were assured confidentiality of both their own identity and the 
identity of their states. This assurance was made in order to encourage openness 
during the interviews. State identities are masked for this phase of data analysis. 
The key informant sample was diversified using data from the pre-survey. 
Characteristics of the key informant sample were: 
Table 5-1: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE KEY INFORMANT SAMPLE 
STATE Degree of  
Compliance 
Punitive 
Response 
to Errors  
QSA Role in 
Enforcement 
Year 
Program 
Established* 
Region 
of USA 
1 Unknown High Yes 1980s Northeast 
2 Unknown High Yes 2010 Northeast 
3 High Low No 1995 Central 
4 Unknown High Yes 2006 West 
5 High Low Yes 1994 Northeast 
6 Unknown High Yes 1987 Central 
7 Unknown Low Yes 2003 West 
8 High High Yes 2002 Northeast 
9 Low Low Yes 1995 West 
10 Unknown Low Yes 1985 South 
11 Unknown Low Yes 2003 Central 
*Source: Rosenthal and Takach  (2007) except State 2 = personal communication 
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 Data related to Research Topic 1 were acquired during the pre-survey and 
were addressed in Chapter 4. This chapter applies the results of the key informant 
interviews to Research Topics 2 – 4. As in Chapter 4, the key findings for each topic 
are followed by the data supporting the finding. 
 
Topic 2: Perceptions of potential causes of underreporting 
KEY FINDING #5: QSMs perceive a wide range of facilitators and barriers to 
compliance by the health care industry with mandatory surgical error 
reporting, and these perceptions match well with the facilitators and barriers 
that the health care industry reports. (ReferenceTables 5-3 (facilitators) and 5-4 
(barriers)) 
Literature review presented in Chapter 2 revealed the perspectives of health 
care providers regarding facilitators and barriers to compliance with external 
reporting requirements. This research considered to what degree QSMs perceived 
similar facilitators and barriers, and whether there was congruence between the 
opinions of the regulators and the industry that they regulate. If health care entities 
believe that obstacles exist to compliance with reporting requirements, do the 
regulatory authorities understand this and acknowledge these same obstacles as a 
step toward overcoming them? 
Individual QSMs frequently recognized one or more facilitators or barriers. All 
three theme dimensions identified in the literature review (internal, system and 
policy) were included for both facilitators and barriers. Of the list of themes identified 
by the health care industry as facilitators and barriers in the literature review, 8 of 9 
facilitator themes and 10 of 13 barrier themes were spontaneously referenced by 
state agencies.  
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TABLE 5-2: CONGRUENCE BETWEEN QSMs AND HEALTH CARE ENTITIES 
REGARDING FACILITATORS TO COMPLIANCE FOUND IN THE LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
Theme 
n= number of states 
reporting this facilitator  
 
Representative QSM Statement 
Internal:  
Culture of Safety 
 
n=1 
The greatest factor we have working in our favor is that 
the people who work as risk managers in these 
positions really do care about patient safety, care that 
their hospitals are not harming people, and often 
recognize that reporting these events increases 
awareness of the events…. 
 
System: Stakeholder 
Involvement  
 
n=6 
When we wanted to have a discussion we do it with the 
full awareness of the provider industry. You know, what 
are our objectives? How do we want to move forward? 
And we want to include them as part of those 
discussions and I think that's always fostered a good 
relationship. 
 
We work really, really closely with the hospital 
association on this. They were one of the organizations 
that helped to get the law passed ten years ago. And so 
they have always been very collaborative with us. 
System:  
Effective Analysis and 
Feedback Loop 
 
n=7 
People have an incentive to report events when they 
see those reports used to improve patient safety. 
 
The health care delivery system as a whole benefits 
from the aggregate data collected through NYPORTS.  
With these data, the Department can identify and 
disseminate trends in patient safety, error-prone 
activities and successful strategies to reduce to  
the risk of those activities. 
System:  
Clear Reporting 
Criteria 
 
n=3 
We hear that they appreciate clarity whenever we can 
make these errors, the definitions, extremely clear.  
 
System: 
Ongoing Training and 
Education 
 
n=2 
To maximize the utility of NYPORTS data and the 
validity of the RCAs produced by facilities, the 
Department provided training for hospitals and D&TC 
staff. 
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Policy:  
Confidentiality of 
Reports 
 
n=1 
 
To promote complete and accurate reporting, Public 
Health Law prohibits public disclosure of NYPORTS 
reports.  
 
Policy:  
Protection from 
Discovery or Negative 
Consequences 
 
n=4 
I think it's just very counterproductive to ask somebody 
to report themselves so that you can hammer them. 
 
This report is not intended to place blame or focus 
attention on specific facilities or individuals.  Such an 
approach would be counterproductive...   
 
Policy:  
Mandatory Nature of 
System 
 
n=6 
…If they knowingly didn't report and we found out about 
it, the consequences would be more serious to them 
than anything that would come about from their 
reporting. 
 
Well, it’s a law. I think that encourages some of the 
compliance 
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TABLE 5-3: CONGRUENCE BETWEEN QSMs AND HEALTH CARE ENTITIES 
REGARDING BARRIERS TO COMPLIANCE FOUND IN THE LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
Theme  
n= number of states 
reporting this barrier 
 
Representative QSM Statement 
Internal:  
Turnover of Personnel 
 
n=2 
I just can't believe how many key people are leaving 
facilities… every time you make those changes…you're 
kind of taking several steps backward before you can 
move forward again. 
Internal: 
Reporting Burden  
 
n=4 
Risk managers do a lot more than report directly to the 
department. They have tons of responsibilities…it's not 
always somebody's top priority to be on top of the 
definitions and understanding them and actively 
developing systems to catch them. 
Internal: 
Lack of Effective 
Internal Systems to 
Identify Errors 
 
n=6 
Oftentimes the risk managers or the other facility staff 
who are responsible for reporting to us aren't aware that 
the events are occurring… 
 
It's really obvious that they're not counting the right thing 
just from looking at the data. I don't think it's intentional, I 
think that they don’t have a good understanding.  
 
System:  
Lack of Control 
 
n=1 
 
They wanted control over it, and because they didn't get 
control over it they lost that battle so they don't want it at 
all. 
System: 
Lack of Clarity of 
Reporting 
Requirements 
 
n=4 
 
I think something else that contributes to underreporting 
is that we don't yet have full definitions of what the 
events are that hospitals are required to report…how 
would we know if it was a retained foreign object after 
surgery if we don't have a definition of “surgery” and we 
don't have a definition of when surgery ends? 
 
System: 
Exposure to Punitive 
Action 
 
n=1 
 
One of the concerns of facilities was that a reportable 
event could be used to instigate a health survey of a 
health care facility.   
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Policy:  
Lack of State 
Resources 
 
n=2 
 
It's tough to make sure you're doing everything you can 
to hold facilities to that level when you don't have the 
staff or the resources. 
 
Policy:  
Concern about Public 
Disclosure 
 
n=4 
I wouldn't be surprised if there were attempts on the 
parts of facilities to reclassify events as not serious 
reportable events when they can because obviously our 
data here are publicly reported and attached to the 
facility name… 
 
Policy: 
Fear of Legal and Civil 
Liability 
 
n=4 
I have heard hospitals say we're supposed to report and 
then there's a chance that we're going to get $100,000 
fine…. I think some facilities would say it's a disincentive 
for them to report because there's a chance that they 
would end up with an administrative penalty.  
The facilities always have an attorney on the line and 
they are very reluctant to pass on much information 
when we have those discussions. I think they're just 
trying from a liability perspective…I think they look at 
that to probably not necessarily complete those self 
reports as they should. 
 
 The QSM interviews provided excellent coverage of the industry-reported 
facilitators and barriers found in the literature review. However, some industry-
reported themes were not noted by the QSMs: 
Facilitators not mentioned: 
 
 Policy: Voluntary nature of a system (Barach and Small, 2000) 
 
Barriers not mentioned: 
 
 System: Lack of feedback and perceived usefulness (Weissman et al., 
2005; Marchev et al., 2003) 
 Policy: Voluntary nature of a system (Weissman et al., 2005; Morton et 
al., 2004) 
 Policy: Mandatory nature of a system (Weissman et al., 2005) 
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 Reference to a voluntary system as a barrier was not considered relevant to 
the discussion of mandatory systems, so the absence of comments in this one area 
is not particularly noteworthy. The three other industry-identified barriers that no 
QSM mentioned were the issue of lack of feedback and perceived usefulness of the 
systems, and the mandatory nature of the systems. The sole industry-identified 
facilitator that no QSM mentioned was a voluntary system. The absence of 
references to these barriers may indicate that the regulatory authorities do not sense 
a powerful deterrent to compliance in these areas. However, the fact that the health 
care industry identified them as barriers indicates that there is an opportunity to 
improve understanding of compliance at the regulatory level. 
 
 Topic 3: Perceptions of the Agency’s role in enforcement 
 Enforcement is the act of ensuring that required error reports are submitted 
by health care entities. It takes the form of the threat of punitive action if a required 
report is not submitted in a timely manner. QSMs reported in the pre-survey that 
they typically use fines and written statements of deficiency to enforce reporting 
requirements. Of 24 QSMs that completed a pre-survey, all but 4 use some type of 
punitive pressure to encourage compliance. 
KEY FINDING #6: QSMs reported varied amounts of support for the concept of 
pursuing compliance with reporting rules.  
Theme 3-1: Enforcement is a priority. 
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 In some states enforcement was made an explicit priority, in both interviews 
and in published reports. In some cases the priority is couched in terms of the 
obvious need to comply with the law: 
It's a statutory requirement so I'd say it's high priority. 
 In other cases states emphasized that enforcement had a practical effect on 
the success of the program, by ensuring accuracy of data and fairness when 
reporting statewide error numbers to the public. This idea was expressed in 
published reports: 
The completeness of reporting is an important concern....If data are not 
complete and accurate, the occurrence frequency or the occurrence rate...for 
hospitals or for a region cannot be accurately computed. 
 
It was also brought up during interview: 
I think it's important to enforce the rules as fairly as we can so that when we 
publicly report at the end of the year, the picture is as accurate as we can 
make it and no facility looks better or worse because they're more or less 
compliant with our regulations. 
 One key informant placed the view that enforcement was important within the 
context of knowledge that under-reporting is a reality: 
I was just recently at an organization focused on…events that sort of relate to 
patients or employees in a facility.…one of them is related to physical 
assaults, and when I showed them the numbers of physical assaults that 
have been reported over the years, I mean, it's a very small number, this one 
person said, “Well, shoot, I know in my facility alone that that happens a lot, 
more often than that.” 
 In another state, the QSM felt that enforcement was an integral part of the 
program’s success, so even though resources were not explicitly dedicated to 
enforcement, she ensured that it remained a priority: 
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So we do see that as certainly part of our role. There’s not an explicit line item 
in the budget for it, it’s just something that is part of the health department’s 
responsibility in administering the law, to make sure that all facilities that are 
required to report understand what the requirements are and follow it.  
 
Theme 3-2: Enforcement is not a priority. 
 Conversely, several states mentioned that enforcement of reporting 
requirements was not a priority. This view was supported by the QSMs either 
because of confidence in the reporting histories in their state:  
We assume as long as each hospital has reported, that they are compliant. 
…. we do not look at individual cases so we don't have anything in place 
where we could say, “While your facility reported, we're not sure that your 
numbers are truthful or accurate”. We don't do that part. 
 Or because they perceived that a positive relationship with the health care 
industry was associated with compliance: 
We have a very, very good working relationship with the hospitals.…I’m not 
aware of anything that we didn’t find out about. 
The QSM in one state was willing to consider the number of reports that were 
made to be the correct number, unless a different number of actual errors was 
brought to the state’s attention, which was a circumstance that had not occurred: 
Compliance is only at the facility level that they actually did report, so they 
could report one case and somebody could argue that they had ten cases, 
but we don't, we've not had that happen and we don't investigate it. 
 
Theme 3-3: Enforcement is vulnerable to pressure from politicians and 
industry. 
 In several states the key informant mentioned stresses placed on the error 
reporting program that inhibit enforcement of requirements. These stresses have the 
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effect of preventing the pursuit of potential missing data and thus contribute to 
possible data starvation in the error reporting program. In one case the stresses 
were the result of a movement in the state legislature to eliminate the program: 
Actually, we've been told that…there will be some legislation passed by 
summer that will eliminate the reporting, so I'm not sure that the current 
administration is willing to put any more resources toward it. 
In another instance, the health care industry was a factor in the legislature’s 
reluctance to establish a more comprehensive program. This state had only a 
general reporting requirement but was considering the same kind of specific event 
reports that many other states use: 
I know a few years ago there were some attempts within the state legislature 
to see if we could get mandatory reporting of adverse events, I think that was 
in 2008, and that didn't get very far within the legislature....There was I think a 
bill drafted but it wasn't presented to the committee. 
Researcher: Was the industry a player in that process? 
Yes. Yes. 
Theme 3-4: Enforcement is vulnerable to resource starvation. 
 In addition to political pressure on enforcement activities, the state programs 
are vulnerable to resource shortages. In many of the states, particularly those with 
newer programs, substantial budgets did not accompany the establishment of the 
reporting programs. Thus, as one QSM stated, they are forced to choose how to use 
their resources among multiple program activities, including enforcement:  
So, we have very few mechanisms in our state to ensure that compliance is 
high. We are not given funding specific for this program. It's part of our 
general funding, so any of the work that we do in the area of compliance has 
to be from within our regular pool of resources 
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 In another state, the QSM went even further: 
We really don’t have any mechanism beyond the ever looming threat of an 
onsite investigation to ensure compliance. 
 One QSM expressed anxiety regarding compliance because he/she already 
had suspicions regarding reporting from surgical centers. In this case, frustration 
about compliance was not merely academic, but arose from concern about data that 
he/she felt might be missing: 
We've had a big problem in the past with having ambulatory surgical centers 
comply with our regulations…We get much, much fewer events reported by 
them and I don't think there's any reason to suspect that their numbers are 
actually that much lower, but we know we have a compliance issue 
there.…It's tough to make sure you're doing everything you can to hold 
facilities to that level when you don't have the staff or the resources. 
 
Theme 3-5: Lack of recourse inhibits enforcement. 
 Several QSMs noted that there is actually little their state can do if a facility 
fails to report. In some cases this inability was based not on resource constraints but 
on a lack of enforcement options:  
All we say is, “In review of your data it appears that your numbers may be 
small, here are the requirements, please review and resubmit.” That's all we 
can do. 
 
We assume as long as each hospital has reported, that they are compliant. 
We do not look at individual cases so we don't have anything in place where 
we could say…we're not sure that your numbers are truthful or accurate. We 
don't do that part. 
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In one state, enforcement was not even an option for the state agency. The 
inability to enforce the requirements was rooted in complete lack of authority over 
hospitals: 
Because we don't license hospitals we don't have any regulatory authority 
over them.  
 
 Researcher: So, would it even be possible to be an enforcer of this 
requirement? 
We cannot, not without new legislation, no. 
 
KEY FINDING #7: Working within the reality of resource scarcity, states make 
strategic decisions regarding the best approach to enforcement.  
 
Theme 3-6: Enforcement decisions are made based on value to the state and 
public. 
 
 Faced with limited resources and multiple program tasks, the decision to 
dedicate resources to enforcement of the reporting requirements is based in many 
states on an assessment of the potential return on investment. The published report 
of one state makes this explicit: 
 
The decision to launch an investigation is influenced by how often the type of 
event has been investigated previously and whether DPH is satisfied with the 
Corrective Action Plan submitted by the facility. 
 
In another state, the QSM chose not to use one potential avenue for 
discovery of unreported events because of technical concerns: 
 
We do have another method of knowing events…but we've never used those 
reports from that other insurance division of the state to drive any type of 
determination of compliance with our regulation. A lot of times, they lag a lot, 
several years normally before everything is done from an insurance 
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perspective, and again we've never said, okay because we get this tool, we're 
going to use that to find compliance with our regulations. 
 
 
 QSMs struggled with the question of whether aggressive enforcement was 
counterproductive, or whether it was in fact necessary even if the health care 
industry objected: 
 
If you go out aggressively after every adverse incident report you perceive, 
but you do not back it up with a powerful monitoring system, [do you actually 
encourage adverse incident reports]? 
 
We also need to be accountable to the public and so have sometimes made 
decisions that the industry wasn't completely happy with because we thought 
it was in the consumer's best interest. 
 
Theme 3-7: States are interested in improving compliance. 
 Despite the political and resource challenges faced by state programs, many 
the QSMs remained enthusiastic about improving reporting compliance. In some 
states this took the form of “nonpunitive” approaches like education to facilities 
regarding reporting requirements: 
I think it would be great if we could improve enforcement, and I think the right 
way to do that would not be through fines or threats, but going facility to 
facility, taking a look at a random sample of their charts, and determining 
what it looks like, whether or not they're in compliance with the regulations, 
and if they're not, doing a little bit of education to help explain where they're 
not quite meeting the regulations. 
Another QSM was concerned that knowledge deficits in one branch of the 
industry may be a factor in inhibiting reporting, and could be addressed through 
education: 
With the ambulatory surgical centers, they might not be as sophisticated with 
respect to the reporting requirements, which is why we've done some 
outreach with them and some additional education. 
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Such approaches have already borne fruit in one state: 
We just felt there was inconsistent reporting between the facilities and in 
some cases there were incidents that occurred that made their way to the 
media's eye…so that prompted us to be proactive and look into it deeper, and 
part of that was to make sure that report completion was high. We've done 
various auditing and because the word gets out and we engage with provider 
associations and the providers directly, that really stimulated them to start 
reporting more comprehensively and to take it more seriously in some cases. 
 In published reports of other states, “punitive” approaches like fines were 
under consideration: 
While ongoing education of providers and clarification of reportable event 
definitions are critical to compliance, stronger penalties for violations of the 
reporting requirements may be needed to induce more consistent 
compliance. 
 
 One QSM who considered enforcement integral to the reporting program felt 
that supporting health care entities to understand the rules was an important aspect 
of enforcement practices. This statement expressed the opinions of many QSMs: 
Part of her role is to make sure that hospitals and surgical centers know what 
the reporting requirements are, and that we’re educating them throughout the 
year, and if she learns of something or if I learn of something that should have 
been reported we’ll follow up. 
 
Topic 4: Agency Role in Data Analysis 
 The final topic area is the issue of the state agency’s role in data analysis. 
This area is important because it generates data trends and facility error histories 
that can be used to “close the loop” by returning knowledge to the public and the 
health care industry. The increased understanding of surgical errors, their causes 
and potential solutions depends on effective use of complete data. The role of state 
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agencies in enforcement relates to the completeness of the data available. The role 
of state agencies in data analysis relates to the effective use of the data that are 
received. 
KEY FINDING #8: QSMs reported varied amounts of support for the concept of 
utilizing data analysis to improve surgical safety. 
Theme 4-1: Feedback to the health care industry is a priority.  
 Several QSMs emphasized that the surgical error data they receive from the 
health care industry should be reflected back to the industry to improve care. This 
represents an understanding and appreciation of the complete reporting cycle 
described in Chapter 1. These QSMs go even farther than this, however. They view 
their agencies’ data analysis as only the beginning of the process of improving 
safety. They seek an active, ongoing communication with health care entities on the 
subject of patient safety, with reported surgical error data playing a part in informing 
the dialogue:  
We don’t just collect the data and put out the public report. We do work very, 
very closely with the hospital association and other entities to do a lot of 
education, doing trainings, putting out resources, safety alerts, emails, phone 
calls, conference calls, things like that, about the trends that we’re seeing, the 
things that are happening, the learnings that we’re finding, so that other 
facilities can really learn from those things.  
 In several states a similar commitment was included in the published annual 
program reports:  
Through these efforts and others, the Department seeks to engage hospitals 
and D&TCs statewide in effective, evidence based strategies to minimize 
adverse events and assure significant improvements in patient safety. 
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The goal of the Indiana State Department of Health is that this data will 
increase focus on these issues and promote the development of evidence-
based initiatives designed to improve patient safety.   
 
Theme 4-2: Feedback to the health care industry is not a priority.  
 As with enforcement efforts, QSMs expressed varying degrees of priority and 
concern regarding the use of reported surgical error data to provide feedback to the 
health care industry in their states. While some QSMs were enthusiastic about their 
own use of data feedback, there was an acknowledgement by other QSMs that 
although feedback was potentially important, because it was not prioritized it did not 
happen: 
Researcher: I'm wondering, inside your agency, how important is it 
considered to do this kind of analysis on surgical errors? 
Um, it's an interesting question…how important is it considered? I think 
probably not. I think everyone theoretically thinks it's very important. When it 
gets involved in the shuffle of all the other things that we have to do, the 
importance level decreases. 
 In other state, the QSM stated that the delivery of feedback to the industry 
was outside the mandate of the agency: 
It's not our role specifically as the survey function to develop the best 
practices or even to encourage best practices because our role as the survey 
agency is, “Did this facility meet the standard in the state or the federal 
requirement?” 
In another state, the program’s reporting requirements played a structural role 
in inhibiting data analysis, because details of events were not shared with the state. 
The responsibility for learning from the event was placed on the reporting facility 
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itself. This left other health care entities unaware of the incident and potential 
preventive measures that could have been discovered through analysis: 
The facility does not provide the Indiana State Department of Health with a  
description of the event. The agency therefore does not have the ability to 
analyze each event. Each event must be reviewed by the facility’s Quality 
Improvement and Assessment Program.   
 
Theme 4-3: Some QSAs would require additional resources to perform data 
analysis. 
 Several of the QSMs noted that, as with enforcement, data analysis requires 
financial or staffing resources that have not been allocated to their programs. Thus, 
even though they may value data analysis, in practice they feel it is beyond their 
capabilities at this time. In several states the program was never fully funded to 
include data analysis and industry feedback: 
Our law had originally called for a more comprehensive quality improvement 
program that would have really looked at adverse events across the system 
and that part of the law was really never funded. 
 
 In another state, the QSM stated that there was no practical analysis of the 
reported data, and even that there was no real ability to verify the accuracy of the 
data: 
Researcher: Is it still true that you really don't have the resources to do very 
much analysis of that data? 
That's true. We don't do any analysis of the data. We barely validate the data. 
 
 As another QSM noted, resource scarcity also includes a lack of sufficient 
time for qualified personnel to perform the analysis: 
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We're so taxed and understaffed and overworked so we don't get around to it, 
but one thing we'd like to do is look more at some of the individual events that 
come in that are very exemplary of a specific problem, and then to kind of do 
a write-up on that and then offer preventative guidance for similar events to 
share with the community, to say “Here's a best practice and here's what 
could happen if it's not done,” and see that on a regular if not routine basis. 
That would be one effort that we are envisioning but just haven't been able to 
put that much time behind. 
In another state, the issue was data shortage itself. The system was relatively 
new, and the QSM felt that sufficient error reports had not been received to provide 
meaningful analysis yet: 
I don't think we even know yet and until we have some more data. I don't 
think we know quite what we're going to do with that. 
 
Theme 4-4: Political pressure influences whether data analysis is made a 
priority. 
 Ultimately, as in so many matters of public safety, the pressure upon the 
bureaucracy by legislatures, industry, media and the public play a major part in 
determining how much of a priority a particular public safety initiative will be. In the 
case of reportable surgical error programs, this prioritization can determine whether 
resources are dedicated to analyzing and using the reported surgical error data for 
patient safety improvement campaigns.  
 The state legislature obviously is a key factor in determining the scope of an 
error reporting program: 
I mean basically what we've been told to do by the legislature, well first of all, 
they passed a law that requires hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers to 
report, and then we have a requirement to do an annual report of all the 
adverse events we received for that calendar year. 
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 In several states it was mentioned that the health care industry plays a 
powerful role in setting the expectations for the relative strength, or even the 
existence, of the error reporting programs. The role can be either negative or 
positive from the perspective of the QSM. In one state, the QSM was concerned that 
the entire error reporting system was in jeopardy due, partly, to dissatisfaction with 
the program by the health care industry: 
Researcher: How serious do you think that threat is to eliminate the system? 
Oh I think it's very. I think that the political strength in our state is such that it 
probably—we're being told that it's going to go away. There's 99% chance 
that it'll go away. 
Researcher: Is the hospital association driving that? 
Yes, yes… they've had a lot of political pull in our state. 
In another state, however, the health care industry played a major role in 
establishing and supporting the program: 
In [our state] the law was passed with the hospital association as part of it. 
They were one of the organizations pushing for it, rather than having it be 
something that was imposed on them. That’s a huge difference. 
 The media’s role was also acknowledged. By requesting data from the state 
agency, the media can provoke analysis by the agency that may not have been 
planned previously: 
We did recently have a public records request for all of the statements of 
deficiency associated with surgical events for the last three years, which if 
that gets blown up in the papers, I think it was a paper that requested it, if that 
leads to a lot of public outcry it will certainly become more important to us 
very quickly. 
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Key Finding #9: QSMs would like to use data more extensively and effectively 
than they currently do. 
Theme 4-5: QSMs envision better analysis and feedback processes. 
 When asked what their ideal use of reported surgical error data would be, and 
how they would like to use this data to improve surgical safety in their states, many 
QSMs had an immediate list of improvements they would like to see in their 
programs. In some cases the improvements involve better statistical analysis of the 
data: 
I would like to…start to also kind of like create a denominator and numerator 
so that these hospitals…actually know based on x-number of surgeries, this is 
the percentile of times this happened…it would give a much better indicator of 
what the frequency of these adverse events are. 
 This improvement was envisioned by the QSM without any prompting or 
references to other states that already create error reporting rates, which suggests 
that improving the comparability of data through standardization is a desire that is 
shared among some QSMs.  
 In other states, the QSM was unsure whether the reported data were 
accurate and complete, and ideally would like to use additional resources to validate 
the data to create an environment in which analysis would be meaningful: 
I think that if we had unlimited resources, it would be useful to do far more 
validation analysis, and we had a validation toolkit that we put 
together…where we would actually go into the hospital and pull charts and do 
some onsite validation. That was our plan, sort of to move that across our 
entire set of measures that we collect from hospitals, so that would have been 
our next step and where we would go with it, if we actually had resources to 
put in place. 
 115 
 
In one state an improvement in the reporting method was anticipated to bring 
an associated ability to manipulate data more easily and productively: 
I think when the new portal becomes available to us in January, I think that's 
going to be an opportunity for us to be able to do more analysis where we'll 
have to spend much less resource actually collecting and compiling the data 
because the computer system will do it for us.  
 
Theme 4-6: QSMs consider education to be a necessary component of data 
analysis. 
 By far the most frequent comment from QSMs on the ideal use of reported 
data was to use them to engage the health care industry to reduce future errors 
through educational opportunities. This was expressed as an interest of the industry 
as well: 
In terms of the data that we have that we're sitting on in these root-cause 
analyses, nothing has been compiled yet, and yes, I think there would be a 
real interest in the facilities being able to have access to summary reports. 
QSMs spontaneously described multiple approaches to sharing their potential 
analyses with the health care industry. These approaches included efforts to clarify 
the reporting requirements as well as application of reported data to improving 
surgical safety: 
We would put in place more education around the specific measures and how 
to report them, actually working with the quality folks within the hospitals, the 
patient safety people within the hospitals, and all that, and then once we got 
those things in place, then we could actually do some true analysis. 
 The possibilities went beyond merely passively distributing data back to the 
industry. QSMs visualized an active partnership with health care entities to 
cooperatively discover safety improvements: 
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Off the top of my head there could also be other ways that we would interact 
with hospitals, maybe through patient safety collaboratives, or there might be 
other ways that we could use that information... 
Published reports of state error programs also expressed the need for actively 
engaging the health care industry as part of the cycle of error reporting and 
feedback: 
[The QSA’s data analysis consultant] asserts that the highest priorities for 
incident reporting systems should be ensuring that those people reporting 
adverse events know that reporting has led to improvements in safety, 
making the best possible use of the information that is reported, involving 
physicians in reporting, and leveraging the advantages of Patient Safety 
Organizations. 
 
Theme 4-7: QSMs perceive resistance from the health care industry as an 
obstacle to data analysis and feedback. 
 Although several states felt that a close agency-industry relationship was 
mutually beneficial and supported effective use of data, other QSMs were more 
pessimistic about the possibility of effective data analysis, because reporting was not 
considered complete in the first place: 
Researcher: If you were given resources to do so, is there some way that you 
would like to use this data to improve health care? 
Well, I think we'd all like to do that. I think the thing is, just compiling all the 
data, and I guess… you'd have to get compliance from the industry to make it 
have some value, and then how do we get that? 
 In another state, the QSM reported that the Patient Safety Organizations in 
the state were not providing sufficient information to permit the state agency to 
report positive results from PSO-generated reports and data: 
I hope to encourage the PSOs to share with DPH and the public what 
improvements to patient safety have resulted, but you will see from the 
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annual Quality of Health Care reports that the PSOs document activities, but 
few results.
  
 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Opportunities 
  
 The research questions described in Chapter 1 and expanded in Chapter 2 
were organized by topic areas for the composition of the pre-survey and key 
informant interview guides. Key findings were generated from the descriptive data 
and themes developed from key informant interviews. In this chapter, key findings 
are reflected back to the original research questions to provide the groundwork for 
answering those questions and revealing opportunities for improvement in 
mandatory surgical error reporting systems. In Chapter 7, the opportunities for 
improvement will be developed into the Plan for Change. 
 The key findings are first mapped to the study topic areas and themes 
developed in the data analysis. The findings are then applied to the research 
questions to generate conclusions. 
TABLE 6-1: KEY FINDINGS MAPPED TO TOPIC AREAS AND THEMES 
Topic Area 
 
Theme Key Finding 
Topic 1: Extent 
of concern 
regarding 
possible 
noncompliance 
 
Findings based on 
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 
Key Finding #1: There is great consistency 
between the states in terms of the types of 
health care entities that must report 
surgical errors and the response of the 
QSA to a report.  
 Findings based on 
Figures 4-3, 4-4, 4-
5, 4-6 and 4-7 
Key Finding #2: There is great variety 
between the states in the definitions of 
surgical errors, disclosure practices, legal 
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protections offered to reporting entities, 
enforcement strategies and internal use of 
the data by the QSAs.  
 Findings based on 
Figures 4-8 and 4-9 
Key Finding #3: About half of the states 
discover unreported surgical errors. The 
discoveries are made through patient and 
family complaints, media reports, and 
medical audits.  
 Findings based on 
Figure 4-10 
Key Finding #4: A large majority of QSMs 
believe that there is no way of determining 
whether all surgical errors are being 
reported as required.  
Topic 2: 
Perceptions of 
potential 
causes of 
underreporting 
 
Findings based on 
Tables 5-3 and 5-4 
Key Finding #5: QSMs perceive a wide 
range of facilitators and barriers to 
compliance by the health care industry with 
mandatory surgical error reporting, and 
these perceptions match well with the 
facilitators and barriers that the health care 
industry reports.  
 
Topic 3: 
Perceptions of 
the Agency’s 
role in 
enforcement 
 
Theme 3-1: 
Enforcement is a 
priority 
 
Theme 3-2: 
Enforcement is not 
a priority 
 
Theme 3-3: 
Enforcement is 
vulnerable to 
pressure from 
politicians and 
industry 
Theme 3-4: 
Enforcement is 
vulnerable to 
resource starvation 
 
Theme 3-5: Lack of 
recourse inhibits 
enforcement 
 
Key Finding #6: QSMs reported varied 
amounts of support for the concept of 
pursuing compliance with reporting rules.  
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 Theme 3-6: 
Enforcement 
decisions are made 
based on value to 
the state and public 
Theme 3-7: States 
are interested in 
improving 
compliance 
 
Key Finding #7: Working within the reality 
of resource scarcity, states make strategic 
decisions regarding the best approach to 
enforcement.  
 
Topic 4: 
Agency Role in 
Data Analysis 
 
Theme 4-1: 
Feedback to the 
health care industry 
is a priority  
 
Theme 4-2: 
Feedback to the 
health care industry 
is not a priority  
 
Theme 4-3: Some 
QSAs would 
require additional 
resources to 
perform data 
analysis. 
 
Theme 4-4: Political 
pressure influences 
whether data 
analysis is made a 
priority. 
Key Finding #8: QSMs reported varied 
amounts of support for the concept of 
utilizing data analysis to improve surgical 
safety. 
 
 Theme 4-5: QSMs 
envision better 
analysis and 
feedback 
processes. 
 
Theme 4-6: QSMs 
consider education 
to be a necessary 
component of data 
analysis. 
 
Theme 4-7: QSMs 
Key Finding #9: QSMs would like to use 
data more extensively and effectively than 
they currently do. 
 
 121 
 
perceive resistance 
from the health 
care industry as an 
obstacle to data 
analysis and 
feedback 
 
 
Conclusions 
Research Question #1: What are the states’ perceptions of compliance with 
mandatory reporting of surgical errors? 
Relevant key findings:  
 Many states discover unreported surgical errors through patient and family 
complaints, media reports, and medical audits 
 
 Most QSMs believe that there is no way of determining whether all surgical 
errors are being reported as required 
 Pre-survey qualitative analysis shows that in twelve of twenty-three 
responding states with mandatory surgical error reporting, the QSM was aware of 
specific surgical errors that should have been reported, but were not. These errors 
came to the QSMs’ attention by many means, such as media, patient complaints 
and data audits. The most frequent routes by which unreported errors came to the 
state agency’s attention were discovery during routine inspections, or through 
patient or family complaints.  
 In an even larger proportion of states (sixteen of twenty-one) the QSM 
believed that it was impossible to determine the degree of compliance or 
noncompliance with reporting requirements. Even in four of the eleven states where 
the QSM was not personally aware of specific unreported errors, QSMs still were not 
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certain that all required reports were filed. Among the QSMs that did believe that 
most or all required reports were made, there was also recognition that there was no 
way to know, or that the belief was founded partly on confidence of a strong 
relationship with health care entities. 
Conclusion:  
 A majority of QSMs felt that it is impossible to know whether their state 
receives all reports of surgical errors that should be reported. 
 
Research Question #2: What are the perceptions of state agencies regarding 
barriers to reporting of surgical errors?  
Relevant key finding:  
 QSMs perceive a wide range of facilitators and barriers to compliance by the 
health care industry with mandatory surgical error reporting, and these 
perceptions match well with the facilitators and barriers that the health care 
industry reports 
 As the literature review demonstrated, the health care industry offered 
multiple, diverse incentives and disincentives to compliance with mandatory 
reporting requirements. These reported barriers and facilitators were categorized on 
the three dimensions of policy, internal and system issues. Of these twenty-two 
themes the QSMs spontaneously identified eighteen that they also believed were 
incentives or disincentives to industry compliance. There was excellent congruence 
between the industry and the QSMs on the subject of barriers and facilitators.  
 The opinions of the health care industry discovered in the literature review 
revolved significantly around concerns about legal and civil liability (8 of 32 journal 
articles mentioned these concerns) and public disclosure and embarrassment (11 of 
32 journal articles mentioned these concerns). When QSMs were asked what they 
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considered to be barriers to reporting, legal and civil liability and public disclosure 
and embarrassment were among the factors cited most often (4 of the 11 key 
informants cited these issues, with only “Lack of effective internal systems” receiving 
more frequent mention). 
 However, the QSMs did not mention several areas that the industry did 
mention, and they are significant. The QSMs did not raise as issues that a voluntary 
system could be a positive influence on reporting, or that a mandatory system in 
itself could have a negative influence. These opinions are essentially two sides of 
the same idea. The health care industry did volunteer these two factors in the 
published literature. Perhaps, because the QSMs all function in states with 
mandatory reporting laws, the mandatory nature of the system may carry a powerful 
presumption as the “normal” condition, and thus did not arise in the view of the 
QSMs as a potential variable.  
 The QSMs also did not identify an industry perception that lack of feedback 
and perceived usefulness of the system could be a barrier to compliance.  This 
seems very important as well, because in several states the QSM noted both that 
the health care industry played a powerful role in the shaping of the error reporting 
program, and that the program was jeopardized by current or pending resource 
shortages.  
Conclusion: 
  
 QSMs understand most of the reasons that the health care industry 
reports for compliance and non-compliance. 
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Research Question #3: If states believe under-reporting is occurring, what is 
their level of concern about it? 
 
 In this study, management of under-reporting is the realm of enforcement. 
Twenty of the twenty-four QSMs that responded to this question on the pre-survey 
reported that their agency does have a responsibility for enforcing the mandatory 
reporting rules. In half of the responding states enforcement consisted of fines for 
failure to report. In addition to fines, some states also conducted investigations 
following the discovery of unreported errors, while others issues statements of 
deficiency for failure to report.  
 Key informants stated that in the absence of complete error reporting, it was 
impossible to assess the degree of risk to patients in their states. Several QSMs also 
expressed their belief that enforcement is necessary to pursue missing data. 
 This perception, and the responsibility to enforce and actions taken implies 
official concern about under-reporting.  
Conclusion:  
 QSMs are concerned about under-reporting. 
 
Research Question #4: If states believe under-reporting is occurring, what are 
they doing about it? 
Relevant key findings: 
 QSMs reported varied amounts of support for the concept of pursuing 
compliance with reporting rules 
 
 Working within the reality of resource scarcity, states make strategic 
decisions regarding the best approach to enforcement 
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  Even in states where enforcement occurs, QSMs do not always receive 
support from their agencies to make enforcement a priority. Instead, it must be 
balanced against other responsibilities for managing the programs. This places the 
agencies in the position of deciding how best to use limited resources.  
 In some states resource availability permits active error surveillance, including 
onsite medical record audits and review of proxy data such as insurance claims. In 
other states, however, there was no dedicated budget or staff for enforcement of 
reporting requirements, and enforcement did not occur, was not made a priority, or 
had to be accomplished outside of formal resource allocation. 
 There was an interesting association between states with a belief in reporting 
compliance and states without active enforcement activities. Four states perceived 
high compliance with reporting rules. Two of these were among the three states with 
no active enforcement activity. The other two were among twenty states that did 
have active enforcement programs. Although the numbers are quite small, 2/3 of the 
states without active enforcement perceived high compliance, while only 1/10 of the 
states with active enforcement perceived high compliance.  
Conclusions:  
 Enforcement can reveal unreported errors, but not all states have 
resources for effective enforcement. 
 
 States with active enforcement programs are more likely to perceive a 
risk of under-reporting. 
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Research Questions #5 and #6: What are states doing with their reported error 
data to improve health care quality? What feedback do state agencies give to 
providers regarding reported errors? 
Relevant key finding: 
 QSMs reported varied amounts of support for the concept of utilizing data 
analysis to improve surgical safety 
 
 QSMs would like to use data more extensively and effectively than they 
currently do 
 Some states have active data analysis and feedback programs, including 
ongoing educational programs and frequent collaboration with health care entities. In 
fifteen of twenty-four responding states, data were analyzed by type of errors and 
trends. An additional five states at least aggregated their reported data. States with 
active analysis and feedback programs have the ability to provide health care 
entities with data that include trends, detailed causation and correction reports from 
root cause analyses, and related research from other patient safety organizations 
and agencies. 
 Nine of twenty four states do not analyze their data, and fifteen of the twenty-
four responding states do not report their analysis back to health care entities. This 
represents a lost potential for partnership with health care providers, and for 
enhancing the perceived usefulness of the programs in those states. 
 In almost all cases, however, QSMs expressed a recognition that reported 
error data could be used to generate problem-solving activities and awareness in the 
health care industry that could reduce the incidence of future errors. Many of the 
QSMs had either active plans in place or visions of an ideal to improve their data 
receipt, validation, analysis and feedback. These plans generally involved 
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partnerships with the health care industry to use the data to stimulate performance 
improvement efforts.  
 In other states, however, there was little or no perceived support for the use 
of the reported surgical error data. Some states did not even have the resources to 
validate the data for accuracy when they were received. Even if there was a desire 
in these states to partner with the health care industry using the reported data for 
improvement, it would be impossible to do so without data to use or means of 
converting the data into generalizable learning. 
 The ability to perform analysis and provide feedback was dependent on 
resource allocation. Resource allocation, in turn, is a political decision. Several 
QSMs reported political influence, either legislatively or by the health care industry, 
that influenced the establishment and support of the error reporting programs in both 
positive and negative ways. 
Conclusions: 
 States value analysis and feedback as part of the effort to improve 
patient safety but not all states have resources necessary to carry out 
these activities. 
 
 More than half of the states apply some analysis to the reported error 
data. 
 
 A smaller number of states that perform analysis also provide feedback 
to the health care industry. 
 
 Some states are unable to perform even basic tasks like data validation, 
much less extensive analysis and feedback. 
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Research Question #7: How do state agencies perceive their role in enforcing 
reporting requirements? 
Relevant key findings: 
 QSMs reported varied amounts of support for the concept of pursuing 
compliance with reporting rules 
 
 Working within the reality of resource scarcity, states make strategic 
decisions regarding the best approach to enforcement 
 
 Twenty of twenty-four responding states have enforcement power to compel 
error reporting. In half of states with enforcement power, fines are used when 
facilities fail to report as required. Other actions, such as issuing a statement of 
deficiencies, are publicly disclosable reports of failure. A statement of deficiencies 
typically also compels a facility to respond with a plan for correction of the fault.  
 In many states, key informant data showed that practical use of enforcement 
power was constrained by resource limitations, by strategic choice, and by 
uncertainty regarding whether there were unreported errors. 
Conclusions: 
 Most states have the authority to enforce their medical error reporting 
rules. 
 
 Use of enforcement power varies between states depending on 
resource availability and the QSAs perception of need. 
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Further Research Opportunities 
 This was a case study of current attitudes and practices among states with 
mandatory surgical error reporting programs. The study revealed perceptions of 
managers of state programs. It did not provide a means of comparing the 
effectiveness of error reporting programs among states. This is a rich area for 
additional research. States have many definitions of reportable errors, degrees of 
enforcement, and differences in response to the error reports, use of the data and 
relationship with the health care industry. All of these factors and more may 
influence reporting rates. Some states do calculate and report error report rates, but 
may use different denominators (discharges, admissions, inpatient days, surgical 
events) that make comparison difficult. Calculation of error reporting rates nationally 
would permit analysis of the different approaches taken in the various states in their 
error reporting rules and processes, and may reveal which approaches are more 
effective at encouraging reporting. 
 Some states have pioneering systems that have been in place for many 
years, using their own definitions long before the NQF definitions were published. 
These states, like New York and Pennsylvania, sometimes have bureaucracies 
dedicated to use and dissemination of error data and to patient safety improvement. 
Other states have adopted error reporting systems only recently. Some may have 
little accompanying infrastructure. In such states, requiring reporting may be the full 
extent of the program. It would be productive to examine the political foundations of 
the more established programs, the legislative intent of the various programs, and 
how these programs are fulfilling the mission given to them by their states. It may be 
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possible that newer programs were adopted without a full recognition of the 
resources and staffing necessary to have an impact on patient safety. 
 Finally, it would be useful to understand the political attitudes and forces in 
states that have not adopted any error reporting programs. The health care 
industry’s role would be particularly interesting to examine in these states.  
Limitations of this Study 
 The study’s design and data successfully answered the research questions. 
However, several limitations should be considered when evaluating the results.  
  The study is cross-sectional, and causal links cannot be established. It is not 
possible, for example, to know from this study whether states with low levels of 
enforcement also tend to have high confidence in reporting compliance because low 
enforcement results in higher compliance, because low enforcement obscures 
awareness of missing reports, or merely by coincidence. Likewise, much of the data 
are descriptive and intended only to provide a picture of the current error reporting 
landscape, rather than to draw correlations between features of systems and results.  
 The pre-survey was subject to selection bias in the choice of which state 
agency representative would be determined to be the QSM. Choices of convenience 
were a risk to objectivity. Convenience choices were mitigated by consulting with 
three other organizations (NASHP, NQF and the State of Oregon (which had 
recently conducted their own studies on the subject)) for advice regarding the most 
qualified contact at state agencies. 
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 Likewise, the key informant sample was subject to selection bias as well. 
Some QSMs were enthusiastic during pre-survey interviews and elaborated at 
length on their programs. There was a temptation to choose these QSMs for the 
further key informant interviews. This selection bias was mitigated by strictly using 
the sampling frame to ensure that a diverse key informant sample was chosen 
based on predetermined attributes. 
 In both pre-survey and key informant interviews, the QSMs were the primary 
source of most of the data. The data depend upon their opinions and recollections 
regarding their respective state systems. Recall bias suggests that more flattering 
responses may be given, depending upon what the respondent believes the 
researcher is interested in hearing. Efforts to compensate for this included actively 
encouraging and expressing an interest in the opinions of QSMs whose perspectives 
were minority opinions, or differed from the researcher’s experience or opinion. 
 The literature review was limited to only one of the four main topic areas. 
Literature relevant to the other three topic areas was not available. For the one topic 
area where literature was available, a majority of the articles reviewed were not 
founded in original research, but were editorial or overview articles. This limitation is 
described more fully in Chapter 2. This limitation was managed by use of the 
literature only for the topic area to which it applied, and by recognizing 
generalizability issues in the articles themselves as explained in Chapter 2.  
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Summary 
 This study provides descriptive data on the features and activities of state 
medical error reporting programs that has not been updated since 2007, and in the 
case of state perceptions of compliance with reporting requirements and state 
agency role in enforcing reporting requirements, have not been previously published.  
 Pre-survey and key informant interview data reveal a reporting landscape in 
which many states doubt the completeness of surgical error reporting, and do not 
believe there is any way to know for certain how many errors are reported as 
required. 
 States recognize most of the reasons that the health care industry gives for 
failure to report as required, with the exception of low perceived value in reporting. 
Because nine of twenty-four states do not analyze their data, and fifteen of twenty-
four states do not report their analysis back to health care entities, there may be a 
relationship between the states’ behaviors (a tendency to not provide feedback to 
the health care industry) and the states’ perceptions (not recognizing that lack of 
perceived value is a barrier to reporting).  
 States have varied degrees of enforcement of their reporting rules and varied 
enforcement strategies and practices. Although many states believe that 
enforcement is useful, not all states have the ability to enforce their reporting rules 
as they would like. 
 Most states analyze the data they receive, but most states do not share their 
analysis with the health care industry. Most states see a value in such sharing, and 
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would like to engage in greater efforts to use reported data in partnership with the 
health care industry to improve patient safety. 
 
  
 
Chapter 7: Plan for Change 
 
 There are multiple opportunities for improvement in the current system of 
mandatory surgical error reporting. This Plan for Change includes recommendations 
addressing many of these opportunities at both state and federal levels. It also 
describes a specific course of action that the researcher will take to influence policy 
and approach in the states. 
Opportunities for System Improvements 
 The current system can be summarized, and opportunities for improvement 
proposed, based on the literature and this study: 
TABLE 7-1: CURRENT SYSTEM AND OPPORTUNITIES 
SYSTEM ATTRIBUTE POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
Slightly less than half of the states 
and federal districts currently require 
reporting of surgical errors 
 
Expansion of state- and federal district-
level reporting 
 
Initiation of nationwide reporting through 
CMS 
 
The states that do require reporting of 
surgical errors have many different 
definitions that preclude state-to-state 
comparisons 
 
Standardization of error reporting 
requirements between states 
Most states that do require surgical 
error reports do not know whether 
they are receiving all of the reports 
Increased awareness of the risk of under-
reporting 
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that that should, and do not have any 
way of knowing 
 
Increased research on the incidence of 
surgical errors 
The industry and some states 
understand that fears of liability and 
embarrassment are powerful 
inhibitors to reporting surgical errors 
 
Increased protections for reporting health 
care entities 
 
Increased awareness of protections for 
health care entities that report as required 
States did not recognize that a lack of 
feedback or perceived usefulness by 
the health care industry was an 
inhibitor to reporting surgical errors 
 
Increased awareness by the states of the 
importance of perceived usefulness of the 
system by health care industry 
States are concerned about under-
reporting, but not all states have 
resources for effective enforcement 
 
Increased resources for enforcement 
States recognized the value of data 
analysis and feedback in contributing 
to improvements in patient safety, but 
do not always have the resources to 
carry out these activities 
 
Increased resources for analysis and 
feedback 
 
Increased state-to-state comparison 
capability 
 
 All of the above issues are possible to change, given sufficient resources. For 
the purposes of this study, change opportunities will be viewed through the lens of 
leverage points as described by Meadows. Causal Loop Diagramming will illustrate 
a key opportunity for improvement to addresses a knowledge deficit among the 
QSAs.  
Leverage Points 
 When prioritizing change, the work of Donella Meadows is very helpful. She 
describes leverage points as “points of power” where “a small shift in one thing can 
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produce big changes in everything” (Meadows, 1999: 1). She proposes a hierarchy 
of leverage points in which the ability to create major changes increases as the 
points become more abstract. The applicable points are compared here against the 
opportunities for change identified in Chapter 6: 
TABLE 7-2: LEVERAGE POINTS AND CHANGE OPPORTUNITIES 
Places to Intervene in a 
System (in increasing 
order of effectiveness)  
(Meadows, 1999: 3) 
 
Opportunity for Change Arena of Change 
8. The strength of negative 
feedback loops, relative to 
the impacts they are trying 
to correct against 
 
Increased resources for 
enforcement 
Legislation 
7. The gain around driving 
positive feedback loops 
 
Increased resources for 
analysis and feedback 
 
Legislation 
5. The rules of the system 
(such as incentives, 
punishments, constraints) 
 
Increased protections for 
reporting health care entities 
 
 
Legislation 
4. The power to add, 
change, evolve, or self-
organize system structure 
 
Standardization of error 
reporting requirements 
between states 
 
Increased state-to-state 
comparison capability 
Legislation 
 
 
 
Administrative 
3. The goals of the system 
 
Expansion of state-level 
reporting 
 
Initiation of federal-level 
reporting 
 
Increased research on the 
incidence of surgical errors 
Legislation 
 
 
Legislation 
 
 
Academic 
2. The mindset or paradigm 
out of which the system—
it’s goals, structure, rules, 
delays, parameters—arises 
Increased awareness of the 
risk of under-reporting 
 
Increased awareness of 
Education to states 
 
 
Education by states 
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 protections for health care 
entities that report as 
required 
 
Increased awareness by the 
states of the importance of 
perceived usefulness of the 
system by health care 
industry 
to health care 
industry 
 
 
Education to states 
 
 As this comparison shows, many of the opportunities for change identified in 
Chapter 6 correspond to leverage points that are closer to the more effective end of 
Meadows’ spectrum. Meadows describes leverage points as counter-intuitive, and 
this comparison seems to reflect this. The assumption that increased resources are 
a fundamental necessity for improvement in bureaucracy is challenged here by the 
higher placement of issues of awareness over issues of system resources. While 
opportunities for change that correspond to leverage points 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 require 
legislative and administrative action, the more powerful leverage point 2 contains 
several opportunities that involve awareness efforts. While the other opportunities 
will not be ignored, it is particularly the opportunities at leverage point 2 for which 
this plan for change presents a specific action program. 
Causal Loop Diagram 
 Causal Loop Diagramming reveals opportunities to influence the dynamics in 
a system. The findings from both the pre-survey and key informant interviews point 
to a phenomenon that is well-illustrated by causal loop diagramming. This 
phenomenon—the cyclical effect of weak programs, weak data, weak feedback and 
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weak perceived usefulness—is shown by the data to be a reality for some states, 
and a risk for others.   
 Causal loop diagramming displays this cycle using variables revealed by the 
data. The resulting loop is an alternative to the ideal cycle of error reporting—a 
possible cycle that may become the reality in some states.  
 The variables of interest in the causal loop are derived from these findings in 
the research: 
Pre-Survey 
15 of 24 states do not share their analysis of surgical error reports with reporting 
health care entities 
 
Literature Review 
Lack of feedback and perceived usefulness was reported as a barrier to compliance 
in two studies and one issue overview  
 
Key Informant Interviews 
Key informants in some states reported that the health care industry could play both 
a positive and negative role in the shape and support of the error reporting system 
 
 Based on these variables, the following causal loop diagram was developed. 
The diagram describes the vulnerability of the error reporting programs to the 
perception of their usefulness by the health care industry. The cycle is a reinforcing 
one (growing in strength, unless and intervention is made), and may operate either 
in a negative or positive way.  
 When negative, the cycle functions in this manner: When programs fail to 
analyze data and then share their analysis with the health care industry, either 
through lack of resources, lack of interest or lack of awareness of the importance of 
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the feedback loop, the industry in turn perceives less usefulness in the program. 
This may convert to less industry support for a program that has a cost to the 
industry (time and effort to comply with error reporting, as well as the risk-cost of 
liability and embarrassment if reports are made). Lower industry support may 
translate into lower political support, which cuts further into the resources available 
for the program to analyze data and share feedback.  
 In a positive iteration, the cycle would result in a stronger program through 
industry support. The health care industry would value the program because the 
feedback received is useful for preventing future errors. In turn, the industry’s 
support would translate into political support, additional resources, and further 
strength in data analysis and feedback. 
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FIGURE 7-1: FEEDBACK TO THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY AFFECTS THE 
STRENGTH OF THE CURRENT ERROR REPORTING SYSTEM    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This causal loop focuses on one of the opportunities for change:  
 Increased awareness by the states of the importance of perceived usefulness 
of the system by health care industry 
 It also relates to two other opportunities, because they are connected to the 
idea of effective data collection and industry confidence in the system: 
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 Increased awareness of the risk of under-reporting 
 
 Increased awareness of protections for health care entities that report as 
required 
 
 The causal loop indicates a powerful opportunity to create change in the 
current system. The opportunity relates to a high level of effectiveness in Meadows’ 
hierarchy. This opportunity will be the focus of this plan for change. 
Plan for Change 
 The plan for change has two components: responding to the educational 
needs portrayed in the causal loop diagram and found on the Meadows hierarchy at 
level 2, and providing recommendations for program improvements found on the 
Meadows hierarchy at levels 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. 
Meadows Level 2 component: 
1. The plan for change will begin with dissemination of the study findings. The 
results will be shared via executive summary with all QSAs. QSAs will be 
informed that they have the option to request an electronic copy of the 
complete study results. The complete study will also be shared with the 
NASHP, the NQF and the AHA.  
2. All QSAs and key national organizations will be invited to participate in a 
webinar hosted by the researcher. The webinar will focus on the Meadows 
Level 2 issues:  
a. Increasing awareness of the QSAs to the issue of perceived 
usefulness of their programs by the health care industry 
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b. Increasing awareness of the QSAs of the risk of under-reporting 
c. Encouraging QSAs to increase health care industry awareness of 
protections offered to reporting entities 
 This aspect of the plan for change reflects the leadership descriptions of 
Kotter, particularly in the distinctions between leadership and management. Several 
of the leadership functions in Kotter guide this plan. Kotter explains that, while 
“Management is about coping with complexity….Leadership, by contrast, is about 
coping with change” (Kotter, 2001: 26). The responsibility for dealing with complex 
reporting systems lies with the QSMs and their executive branch leaderships. 
Guiding change in the overall reporting systems is a leadership process that many 
people, including the researcher, can join. 
 The contrast between management and leadership is extended by Kotter to 
several key functions, each of which describes the place of this study in influencing 
change at the governmental level: 
 Planning and budgeting vs. Setting a direction: The tasks of implementing 
program work, including resource allocation, are located at the managerial level in 
the state agencies. The researcher’s role in this plan is to generate a vision: “What’s 
crucial about a vision is not its originality but how well it serves the interests of 
important constituencies—customers, stockholders, employees—and how easily it 
can be translated into a realistic competitive strategy” (Kotter, 2001: 28). This plan 
presents a vision of awareness of the risk of under-reporting, clarity of protections 
offered, and recognition of the importance of the perception of value by the health 
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care industry. The plan will communicate this vision to attempt to generate 
enthusiasm for a higher level of awareness of these factors at the state agency level. 
 Aligning people vs. Organizing and staffing: Staffing, like budgeting, is an 
administrative and managerial function. The state agencies will have to make their 
own decisions about staffing and organizing their programs. This plan seeks to align 
key state agency managers with a particular perspective. Kotter states that this is 
“…more of a communications challenge than a design problem….Anyone who can 
help implement the vision and strategies or who can block implementation is 
relevant” (Kotter, 2001: 29). This plan seeks alignment of stakeholders through 
broad distribution of the findings of this study, and open invitation to the educational 
webinar. 
 Motivating people vs. controlling and problem solving: Ultimately, the 
changes envisioned in this plan require enthusiastic buy-in from multiple 
stakeholders: state and federal agencies, health care entities, and even the general 
public. This plan is a first step toward changing the status quo in an effort to 
strengthen and broaden medical error reporting systems. Kotter states that effective 
motivation requires recognition of the values of the audience, involvement in 
implementation of the vision, ongoing support and recognition and reward (Kotter, 
2001: 30). This plan will include the first of these qualities: recognition of the values 
of the audience. The data showed that QSMs value error reporting, question its 
completeness and wish to use their data effectively. The dissemination of the study’s 
findings will emphasize an understanding of these shared values. 
Meadows Levels 3 – 8 component: 
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 The plan for change for these elements consists of recommendations to be 
shared with key stakeholders. These recommendations all involve legislative action 
and budget decisions. The influence of this study in these arenas is dependent upon 
the decisions of the stakeholders and their political choices. Dissemination of the 
study results will provide stakeholders with information and support for decisions to 
strengthen and broaden the health care error reporting systems nationwide. 
 In addition to the QSAs and national organizations mentioned above, study 
recommendations will be shared with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), because the most radical suggestion in the Plan for Change is a 
federal requirement for reporting of surgical errors. Existing relationships with 
personnel in CMS Region X (Seattle) will be leveraged for dissemination of the 
findings to CMS.  
 Recommendations in this stage include: 
Strengthening Existing Systems 
 Efforts to improve compliance with state reporting requirements should 
address systemic barriers identified by the reporting health care entities as well as 
those described by state agencies, and thus should concentrate on strengthening 
the awareness of states about potential problems in compliance with error reporting, 
removing systemic barriers to reporting where possible, and supporting the 
meaningful use of data.  
 Existing state reporting systems display great variability regarding types of 
errors that must be reported, types of institutions that must report, protections from 
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disclosure and liability, and data analysis and release. The variation between state 
systems makes state-by-state comparisons of the efficacy of reporting systems 
difficult. More importantly, the actions taken in some states to encourage and 
enforce compliance are not applied uniformly across the nation, creating a likelihood 
of variation in reporting rates that makes assessment of relative patient safety 
between states impossible. Under a uniform and effective reporting system it should 
be possible to determine whether some states are more successful than others at 
reducing surgical errors, and to learn from these successes. 
 Recommendations for strengthening existing state systems include the 
following points: 
1. Enhanced awareness of reporting lapses and barriers. States should 
consider the evidence provided by investigative reports and internal 
inquiries that demonstrate failure of institutions to submit all required 
reports. 
 
2. Removing barriers to compliance with mandatory reporting. Reports 
from the health care industry clearly and consistently identified causes of 
potential under-reporting. States should be aware of those areas identified 
by the health care industry that were not recognized by the states. States 
should be encouraged to engage in system reform, which should include 
improved enforcement of reporting requirements and meaningful 
assurances to the health care industry regarding liability and 
discoverability protections. In states with weak protection for reported 
errors, legislation should establish or increase protection. 
 
3. Support meaningful use of data. Data that do not pass through effective 
state agency analysis and public dissemination are not available for 
industry to use as a knowledge base to support patient safety 
improvement efforts. Data that are handled differently in different states 
are not available for effective comparative analysis nationally. As 
Mehtsun, et al., note: “A centralized mandatory reporting mechanism that 
would require uniform reporting criteria across states would minimize the 
surveillance bias inherent in current estimates” (Mehtsun et al., 2012: 6).  
 
Each of these factors must be addressed: 
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a. Standardized definitions and requirements: Standard definitions of 
medical errors between states will permit comparative analysis of state 
reports, reporting rates, and possibly error rates. States should, at a 
minimum, use a consistent set of definitions for reportable errors, even 
if they choose to add other medical errors to their own internal list of 
reportable events. NQF definitions are the most commonly used 
among the various systems currently established. Unless another 
system becomes prominently consistent among the states, the NQF 
definitions should become the minimum required reportable events in 
states. 
 
b. Interstate sharing: Databases and dissemination of analyses should 
be standardized to the extent possible among states, so that data may 
be shared in a consistent manner nationally. Sharing data and analysis 
between states is essential for learning about reporting system 
effectiveness at the governmental level. The ability to share 
information between state systems will require compatible technology 
and interstate centers for data aggregation. The example of the 
University of Michigan, which collects and transmits quality outcomes 
for dialysis centers nationwide, is a model for such an error 
aggregating resource. 
 
Widening the Reporting Universe 
 Because knowledge of the means of preventing errors requires, in part, 
awareness of the types and prevalence of errors, efforts should also be directed 
toward increasing the number of governmental agencies that require reporting of 
surgical and other medical errors, both at the state and national level. 
 The above steps will strengthen medical error reporting systems in those 
states that have adopted such systems by law or regulation. At least 26 states, 
however, have either ended their error reporting program or have not adopted any 
mandatory medical error reporting system at this time. Furthermore, federal 
healthcare systems such as the Veterans Administration are not included in state-
level reporting because they are not subject to state authority. Widening the 
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reporting universe will require two efforts, both of which involve federal power: 
Incentives for the expansion of state reporting, and a new role for the federal 
government in the error reporting process: 
1. Encouragement for all states to institute mandatory reporting 
systems. The federal government has the ability, through the tremendous 
power it wields through health care financing, to incentivize adoption of 
error reporting systems in the states that do not currently have such 
systems. These incentives could come through programs that direct 
federal funds to state governments for provision of health care. Medicare, 
Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act are three possible avenues for 
incentivization. The incentives could take the form of either positive or 
negative pressure: Additional funding for states that do implement 
reporting systems, or decreased funding for states that do not.  
 
2. Institute mandatory reporting systems through CMS. CMS would be a 
unifying factor in the national patchwork of error reporting systems. Almost 
all hospitals in the United States are certified by CMS as providers of care 
under the Medicare system. These hospitals must be in compliance with 
Medicare Conditions of Participation. The implementation of a mandatory 
medical error reporting system through the CMS rules would immediately 
cover 81.55% of hospitals in the United States (4726 Medicare-certified 
hospitals out of 5795 total hospitals (CMS, 2011 and AHA, 2011)), as well 
as all Medicare-certified ambulatory surgical centers. The Medicare 
Conditions of Participation for hospitals and Conditions for Coverage for 
ambulatory surgical centers should be amended to include a requirement 
for reporting of medical errors to either the state agencies with which CMS 
contracts for survey and certification processes, or directly to a CMS 
system that would be established for the purpose. A centralized, CMS-
based system would be preferable, because of the consistency of data 
management that would be available as well as the ability to immediately 
enforce reporting requirements through the CMS enforcement system.  
Such a system would go further than the recommendations of the 
Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services, 
which urged CMS to ensure that state agencies do a better job of 
monitoring hospital corrective action plans following errors, that error-
related Medicare complaint surveys include analysis of the Condition of 
Participation for Quality Assurance and Performance Improvement, that 
hospitals receive more specific information about complaints being 
investigated, and that CMS communicate error reports with accrediting 
organizations such as the Joint Commission (Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2011). 
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3. Institute mandatory federal hospital reporting system. The federal 
government operates approximately 211 hospitals (AHA, 2011) that are 
outside the authority of state agencies. Some of these hospitals are 
Veterans Administration health care centers. The appropriate federal 
agencies managing these hospitals should initiate a mandatory error 
reporting system consistent with that operated by the states and, ideally, 
by CMS.  
 
Timeline for Plan for Change 
Dissertation completed and approved by committee 
 
March, 2013 
Executive Summary written 
 
March, 2013 
Executive Summary distributed to all QSAs and key national 
organizations 
 
April, 2013 
Webinar prepared 
 
April, 2013 
Webinar delivered 
 
April, 2013 
Recommendations delivered to QSAs and CMS 
 
April, 2013 
 
 
Impact of the Plan for Change 
 It is unknown at this time how many surgical errors actually occur annually in 
the United States. This lack of knowledge means that systems for learning and 
prevention of future errors lack accurate information about the incidence and causes 
of surgical errors in the USA. Strengthening the cycle of error reporting would 
stimulate analysis of errors, permit accurate assessments of the risk and severity of 
error incidence, and support planning and resource allocation to reduce the 
incidence of error and increase patient safety.   
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 Implementation of the Plan for Change would result in several major 
improvements in the inconsistent national patchwork of error reporting systems: 
1. States would recognize the risk of under-reporting 
 
2. States would recognize the importance of feedback to the health care 
industry 
 
3. States would support and encourage compliance with mandatory error 
reporting by enhancing enforcement and extending liability and 
discoverability protections 
 
4. States would use uniform basic reporting requirements and definitions 
and would have uniform basic data management programs that would 
permit state-to-state comparison of error reporting data, possibly 
including error reporting rates and potentially even including actual 
error rates 
 
5. All states would be supported by the federal government to establish 
mandatory error reporting systems 
 
6. CMS would require error reporting as part of the requirement for 
Medicare certification for health care institutions 
 
7. The federal government would establish mandatory error reporting 
systems to cover the hospitals within its control 
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Appendix A: Study Purpose and Confidentiality 
 
Dear ______________________, 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study, which is will become part of my 
dissertation for my doctoral degree in public health at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. This research is conducted under the supervision of my 
dissertation committee chair. 
 
The topic of the study is the role of state agencies in receiving reports of medical 
errors from health care entities. Your participation in this study will lead to greater 
understanding of the way states respond to reports of medical errors.  
 
The study will consist of two parts:  
 
A voluntary brief telephone survey and, for those who agree to participate, a 
voluntary second telephone interview.  
 
Your completion of the initial survey will be extremely helpful in creating a picture of 
the various state reporting systems that currently exist in the United States. Your 
participation in the initial survey does not obligate you to participate in the second 
interview. 
 
If you agree at the end of the initial survey to further participation in this research, 
you may be contacted for a second telephone interview. This interview will give an 
opportunity for participants to describe their state systems more fully and express 
their opinions regarding medical error reporting. 
 
The second interview is confidential. Your name, and the name of your state, will not 
be used in the interview results that are written as part of this research. All surveys, 
transcripts and other data will be destroyed when the research project is completed. 
 
I welcome any questions you may have about this research project. You may 
contact me at: throne@live.unc.edu 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Throne, MSW, MPH 
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Appendix B: Pre-Interview Survey Guide 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this brief survey. This survey is part of my 
research for my doctoral degree in public health at the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill. Completing this survey is voluntary and should take no longer than 15 
minutes. 
 
Your participation in this survey will lead to greater understanding of the way states 
respond to reports of medical errors. For the purposes of this survey, a reportable 
medical error is defined as any medical error that your state requires to be reported 
to you by a state-licensed facility. 
 
This survey consists mostly of information that is publicly available. Although your 
state may be specified in data that are reported from this survey, your name will not 
be used in the results that are written as part of this research. Data will be stored on 
a secure server at the University of North Carolina. All surveys and other data will be 
destroyed when the research project is completed. 
 
All surveys and recordings will be destroyed when the research project is completed. 
 
Do you have any questions about this interview or this study? 
 
May I have your permission to record this interview? 
 
Opening 
 
1. Does your agency receive reports of surgical errors from facilities where 
surgery takes place? 
 
2. Are you personally responsible for receiving or managing reports of surgical 
errors? 
 
Facilities 
 
3. Which of the following surgical facilities are required to report errors to your 
agency? 
 
o Hospitals 
o Ambulatory surgical centers 
o Dental surgery centers 
o Office-based surgery 
 
 
 
4. When facilities have reported a surgical error to your agency, does or has 
your state take any of the following actions?  
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o Required the facility to conduct its own internal investigation 
o Conducted a state investigation of the reported incident 
o Issued a statement of deficiencies 
o Required a plan of correction 
o Issued a fine 
o Revoked a facility’s license 
o Conducted an investigation of the practitioner(s) involved 
o Other 
 
5. Has your agency ever become aware of surgical errors that should have been   
reported by the facility, but were not? 
6. How did you become aware of the errors in those cases? 
 
Disposition of Reports 
 
7. Are reported surgical errors disclosable to the public or media in any of these 
ways in your state? 
  
o Yes, as aggregate data only 
o Yes, with disclosure of: 
o Facility name 
o Type of error 
o Date of error 
o No, errors are not disclosable 
 
8. Are facilities that report surgical errors to our agency protected legally in any 
of these ways? 
 
o Yes: 
o Protection from discovery 
o Protection from liability 
o Other legal protection 
o No, there is no legal protection given to facilities that report 
 
Reporting 
 
9. What definitions does your state use for reportable surgical errors? 
 
o The Joint Commission Sentinel Events 
o National Quality Forum 29 Reportable Events 
o We developed our own definitions 
 
10. If you developed your own definitions, which of the following are included in 
the definition of reportable surgical error in your state? 
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o Surgery on the wrong patient 
o Surgery on the wrong body part 
o Wrong surgical procedure performed 
o Foreign body left unintentionally 
o Death of an ASA class I patient during or immediately after surgery 
o Other _________________________________ 
 
11. In your opinion, what % of reportable surgical errors in your state are actually 
reported to your agency? 
 
Process 
 
12. When surgical errors are reported to your state agency, which of the following 
is done with the information? 
 
o Data are aggregated 
o Data are analyzed for types of errors 
o Data are analyzed over time for trends 
o Data are disseminated to the health care industry 
o Other 
o Nothing is done with the data 
 
13. Does your state agency have a role in enforcing the law that surgical errors 
must be reported to you? 
 
o Yes 
o If yes, what does the state do to enforce the law? 
o No 
 
14. May I contact you if I have any questions about your state’s policies on 
reportable surgical errors? 
 
15. Would you be willing to participate in a second interview on this topic? 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey.  
  
 154 
 
Appendix C: Key Informant Interview Guide 
 
[NOTE: Primary questions are in bold; potential follow-up or extending questions are 
in italics] 
 
Thank you for taking the time to talk with me today about your agency’s role in 
medical error reporting. This interview is part of my research for my doctoral degree 
in public health at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The interview 
should take about 30 minutes. 
 
The purpose of this interview is to learn more about how your state receives medical 
error reports from facilities that are required to report medical errors to you. 
Specifically, I am interested in how your state receives and manages reports of 
surgical errors. For the purpose of this interview, a reportable surgical error is 
defined as any surgical error that your state requires to be reported to you by a 
facility. 
 
This interview is confidential. Your name, and the name of your state, will not be 
used in the results of the interviews that are written as part of this research. All 
surveys and recordings will be destroyed when the research project is completed. 
 
Do you have any questions about this interview or this study? 
 
May I have your permission to record this interview? 
 
 
Topic Area: Extent of concern regarding possible noncompliance 
 
What priority are you asked to give to the issue of compliance with reporting 
requirements? 
 
How are compliance and noncompliance discussed within your agency? 
 
How does your agency assess compliance with reporting requirements? 
 
Thinking about the specific category of surgical errors, to what extent do you think 
your state is receiving all of the reports that it should? 
 
 
Topic Area: Causes of Underreporting 
 
If you were not receiving all of the reports that you should, what do you think 
may be some of the reasons for that? 
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Has your agency received any feedback from the industry about your reporting 
requirements?  
 
If so, what feedback have you received? 
 
Topic Area: Enforcement 
 
Is it your agency’s role to be involved in enforcing the requirements for 
surgical error reporting? 
 
How important do you think it is for your agency to be involved in enforcement? 
 
How effective do you think your agency is at enforcing compliance? 
 
Do you think there are any specific factors that encourage compliance? 
 
Do you think there are any specific factors that discourage compliance? 
 
Topic Area: Analysis 
 
What does your agency do with the data it receives when facilities report 
surgical errors to you? 
 
How important is it in your agency to analyze the information you receive on surgical 
errors? 
 
How does your agency use the reporting process to make surgery safer? 
 
How would your agency use this data in an ideal world? 
 
Conclusion 
 
Is there anything else you would want me to know about your agency’s role in 
receiving reports of surgical errors? 
 
Do you have any questions for me about this research? 
 
Thank you for taking the time to talk with me today about your agency. 
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Appendix D: Results of the Pre-Survey 
 
 
HEALTH CARE ENTITIES REQUIRE TO REPORT SURGICAL ERRORS 
BY STATE 
 
STATE HOSPITALS AMBULATORY 
SURGICAL 
CENTERS 
DENTAL 
SURGERY 
CENTERS 
OFFICE-
BASED 
SURGERY 
CA ● ●   
CO ● ●   
CT ● ●   
DC ● ●  ● 
FL ● ●   
GA ●    
IN ● ●   
KS ● ●   
ME ● ●   
MD ●    
MA ● ●   
MN ● ●   
NH ● ●   
NJ ● ●   
NY ●   ● 
NV ● ●   
OH ●    
PA ● ●   
RI ● ●   
SC ● ●   
SD ● ●   
TN ● ● ●  
UT ● ●   
VT ●    
WA ● ●   
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RESPONSE BY THE STATE TO REPORTED SURGICAL ERRORS 
STATE REQUIRE 
INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATION 
STATE 
INVESTIGATION 
SOD POC FINE ACTION 
AGAINST 
ENTITY 
LICENSE 
INVESTIGATE  
PRACTITIONER 
CA ● ● ● ● ● ●  
CO  ● ● ●    
CT ● ● ● ●    
DC ●   ●    
FL ●   ●    
GA ● ● ● ● ●   
IN ●   ●    
KS ● ● ● ●    
ME ●       
MD ● ● ● ●    
MA ● ● ● ●    
MN ●       
NH ● ● ● ●  ●  
NJ ●   ●    
NY ●   ●    
NV ●   ●    
OH        
PA        
RI ● ●  ●    
SC        
SD ● ● ● ●  ●  
TN  ● ● ●    
UT ●   ●    
VT ●       
WA ●       
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DISCLOSURE OF REPORTED SURGICAL ERROR DATA BY THE STATE 
STATE AGGREGATE 
ONLY 
FACILITY 
IDENTIFIED 
BY TYPE OF 
EVENT 
BY DATE OF 
EVENT 
NO 
DISCLOSURE 
CA  ● ● ●  
CO  ● ● ●  
CT ● ● ●   
DC ●     
FL   ●   
GA     ● 
IN ● ● ●   
KS ●  ●   
ME   ●   
MD ●  ●   
MA  ● ● ●  
MN  ● ●   
NH  ● ●   
NJ  ● ●   
NY ● ● ●   
NV  ● ●   
OH  ● ●   
PA      
RI      
SC      
SD      
TN ●     
UT ●     
VT      
WA  ● ● ●  
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PROTECTIONS OFFERED TO REPORTING ENTITIES 
STATE PROTECTION  
FROM DISCOVERY 
PROTECTION 
FROM LIABLITY 
OTHER 
PROTECTIONS 
NO 
PROTECTION 
CA    ● 
CO ●    
CT     
DC ● ●   
FL ●    
GA ●    
IN     
KS ●    
ME ● ●   
MD ●    
MA    ● 
MN ●    
NH ●    
NJ ●    
NY ●    
NV ●    
OH    ● 
PA    ● 
RI ●    
SC     
SD     
TN ●    
UT ●    
VT    ● 
WA    ● 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 160 
 
DEFINITION OF SURGICAL ERROR 
STATE SAME 
AS NQF 
OWN DEFINITION IN ADDITION TO OR INSTEAD OF NQF 
CA ●  
CO  death, neglect 
CT ● patient death or serious disability as a result of surgery 
DC ●  
FL 
 wrong patient, wrong body part, wrong procedure, foreign 
body, wrong diagnosis, injury not a known risk 
GA 
 wrong patient, wrong body part, wrong procedure, 
unanticipated death 
IN ●  
KS 
 all occurrences when the standard of care was not met and 
injury occurred or was probable 
ME ●  
MD  death or serious disability 
MA ●  
MN ●  
NH  Extensive list of events in state statute RSA 151 
NJ 
 wrong patient, wrong body part, foreign body, ASAI, other 
adverse preventable events 
NY 
 Same as NQF but delete ASA I death and add unexpected 
death 
NV  death or serious injury 
OH  retained foreign body 
PA ●  
RI  wrong patient, wrong procedure, other specified in law 
SC  Incidents resulting in death or serious injury 
SD  death resulting from abuse/neglect 
TN  abuse/neglect 
UT ●  
VT ●  
WA ●  
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ANALYSIS OF DATA BY STATE 
STATE AGGREGATE 
ONLY 
ANALYZED 
BY TYPE 
ANALYZED 
BY 
TRENDS 
DISSEMINATED 
TO HEALTH 
CARE INDUSTRY 
OTHER 
USE 
NO DATA 
ANALYSIS  
CA  ● ● ●   
CO      ● 
CT ● ● ● ●   
DC ● ● ● ●   
FL      ● 
GA  ● ●    
IN ● ● ●    
KS ● ● ● ●   
ME  ● ●    
MD  ● ● ●   
MA      ● 
MN  ● ● ●   
NH      ● 
NJ ● ● ●    
NY  ● ● ●   
NV  ● ●    
OH      ● 
PA  ● ● ●   
RI  ● ●    
SC       
SD      ● 
TN      ● 
UT  ● ● ● ●  
VT      ● 
WA      ● 
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ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS BY STATE 
STATE FINE STATEMENT 
OF 
DEFICIENCIES 
INVESTIGATION LICENSURE 
ACTION 
OTHER  NO 
ENFORCEMENT 
ACTION 
CA ●      
CO      ● 
CT ● ●     
DC ●      
FL ●      
GA  ●     
IN ● ●     
KS      ● 
ME ●      
MD ●      
MA   ●    
MN     ●  
NH ●      
NJ ●    ●  
NY ●    ●  
NV ●      
OH      ● 
PA     ●  
RI ● ●     
SC       
SD    ●   
TN  ●     
UT      ● 
VT     ●  
WA     ●  
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Appendix E: Pre-Survey Responses to the Question: 
 
“Of the surgical errors that occur in your state, and are required to be reported 
to your agency, what % do you think are actually reported?” 
Category of 
Response 
QSM Perspective Theme 
Impossible 
to know if all 
events are 
reported 
Can I say exactly what percentage is 
actually reported? I don’t know that. 
True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
 That is impossible to answer.  True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
 It’s impossible to know what’s actually 
reported.  
True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
 I would have no way of knowing how 
accurate our reports are. Everybody knows 
they’re not getting the reports they should 
be. 
 
True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
 We don’t really have a way of gauging it at 
this time…. 
True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
 We wouldn’t know. Given the perverse 
incentive the hospitals have to not file the 
report and the style of litigatory system we 
have--being the worse the error, the 
greater exposure, the greater the incentive 
to shield it--who knows what’s going on? 
 
True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
 
Legal risk inhibits 
reporting 
 You know, I couldn’t even begin to tell you 
but I would hazard…I don’t know, it’s really 
hard to say.  
 
True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
 That’s a hard one. We’re currently doing a 
report on underreporting. We don’t know 
what we don’t know. 
 
True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
 …It makes it next to impossible to know 
how many events we really have occurring 
out there in the state if the facility doesn't 
self-report and we don't get those calls in.  
True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
 
Vulnerable to entity 
 164 
 
choice whether to 
report 
 We don't have authority to go out and 
scour through medical records and 
interview people to find out if really all 
events are being reported or not but I think 
there is, I would say a general sense that 
there's underreporting. 
 
Lack of resources 
inhibits knowledge 
of true number of 
events 
 There's that huge discrepancy between 
what you hear from national experts about 
all these reports, it just sounds like 
thousands of people are being killed every 
year but that's just not the experience that 
we're seeing here through our reporting 
program, so I don't know how you fill that 
gap, or what's the truth. Where does the 
truth lie? 
 
True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
 You can’t really know for sure, you have to 
put different cross-checks in place to make 
sure you got things. 
 
True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
Most or all 
events are 
reported 
I don’t have any way to be able to 
determine that. We operate on good faith 
here. I’m guessing a majority of those that 
are required to be reported [are reported].  
True number of 
reportable events is 
unknown 
 
Confidence in 
relationship with 
entities 
 
 I think every one. We have a very, very 
good working relationship with the 
hospitals. I’m not aware because usually 
what happens, if there was something that 
they were a little late in reporting to us, 
usually one of the employees will leak it 
out.  
 
Confidence in 
relationship with 
entities 
 I would say it’s fairly accurate….We don’t 
do any kind of audit. The reporting is pretty 
low in most states but I couldn’t really say 
although there’s no negative outcome to 
reporting. That doesn’t mean they want to 
report them. 
Confidence in 
relationship with 
entities 
 
Vulnerable to entity 
choice whether to 
report 
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Few events 
are reported 
The numbers are still big numbers but 
we're just not seeing that volume in our 
state system, and I don't think it's because 
we're so much safer. I think it's just 
because there's just underreporting. 
Suspicion of under-
reporting 
 If we look at ICD-9 for object left in, and 
surgery for object left in, it would look like 
our reporting is somewhat like 40%.…I’d 
say we’re getting under 50% in two years. 
 
Data reveal under-
reporting 
 Hospitals and ASCs are our poorest 
performers in following that rule. I don’t 
know why. Potentially legal gets involved. 
They are reluctant to report neglect on 
staff’s part, to make an official document 
that’s reported to the state. 
Suspicion of under-
reporting 
 
Vulnerable to entity 
choice whether to 
report 
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Appendix F: Regrouping Guide 
 
Some data regrouping was conducted. The purpose of the regrouping was to create 
categories of difference between states based on the characteristics reported by the 
state agencies. Several survey questions required regrouping, while others were 
already sufficiently categorized. The regrouped data were managed according to this 
guide: 
 
Survey 
Question 
Responses Available Regrouping: 
When a facility 
reports a 
medical error to 
your agency, 
what responses 
may your state 
take? Please 
select all 
answers that 
apply. 
 
o REQUIRE THE FACILITY 
TO CONDUCT AN 
INTERNAL INVESTIGATION 
o CONDUCT A STATE 
INVESTIGATION OF THE 
REPORTED INCIDENT 
o ISSUE A STATEMENT OF 
DEFICIENCIES 
o REQUIRE A PLAN OF 
CORRECTION 
o ISSUE A FINE 
o REVOKE A FACILITY’S 
LICENSE 
o CONDUCT AN 
INVESTIGATION OF THE 
PRACTITIONER(S) 
INVOLVED 
o NONE OF THE ABOVE 
1, 2 or 3 positive 
responses = Punitive 
Score 1 – 3 
 
4, 5, or 6 positive 
responses = Punitive 
Score 4 – 6 
 
0 positive responses = 
Non-Punitive 
Are reported 
medical errors 
disclosable to 
the public or 
media in your 
state? 
o YES, AS AGGREGATE 
DATA ONLY 
o YES, WITH ONLY 
FACILITIES DISCLOSED 
o YES, WITH FACILITIES 
AND SPECIFIC ERROR 
TYPES DISCLOSED 
o YES, WITH  
FACILITIES AND SPECIFIC 
ERROR DATES 
DISCLOSED 
o NO, ERRORS ARE NOT 
DISCLOSABLE 
0 positive responses = 
No disclosure 
 
Positive response to 
Aggregate Data Only = 
Aggregate Only 
 
Positive response to 
any other option = 
Facility Identified, with 
or without type and date 
When surgical 
errors are 
reported to your 
state agency, 
what is done 
o DATA ARE AGGREGATED 
o DATA ARE ANALYZED FOR 
TYPES OF ERRORS 
o DATA ARE ANALYZED 
0 positive responses = 
No Analysis 
 
Positive response to 
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with the 
information? 
OVER TIME FOR TRENDS 
o DATA ARE DISSEMINATED 
TO INDUSTRY 
o NOTHING IS DONE WITH 
THE DATA  
aggregated only = data 
aggregated only 
 
Positive response to 
“Data are analyzed for 
types of errors”, or 
positive response to 
“Data are analyzed over 
time for trends” = data 
analyzed for types 
and/or trends 
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